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I. Introduction
The most important and fundamental questions are the toughest to
answer. Questions like When does human life begin?' and Who can ter-
minate life, and under what circumstances? 2 confound and bedevil to no
end. The most' basic question of all-What is the meaning of life? 3-
evokes especial anguish, for although it readily yields contingent and
provisional answers, it steadfastly defies fixedness and closure. Many
consider this question, if at all, only at times of personal crisis, when
long-held convictions come under serious challenge and must withstand
severe scrutiny or be discarded. It is perfectly understandable why peo-
ple struggle with foundational matters so rarely: few of us can function
effectively while lingering over such vexing questions for prolonged peri-
ods. Inasmuch as everything we do flows from and vitally depends on
our stance toward root issues, however, the lack of contemplation is odd.
These observations apply with even greater force to collective orga-
nisms. The presence of so many parties, each with a potentially different
vision of collective purpose as a substantive matter, and each possibly
claiming parity of voice as a procedural matter, further complicates in-
quiry into ultimate institutional meaning. Indeed, much American law
1. The Supreme Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), has fueled rather than
settled the controversy around this question. See, eg., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Roe opinion
is on a collision course with itself); Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade,
95 YALE L.J. 639, 668 (1986) (explaining that the Roe Court selected the viability distinction to
avoid deciding when life begins). The Supreme Court addressed the abortion issue in 1989 in Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3047-85 (1989), and will take it up again in the
1989-1990 term. The Court granted petitions for writs of certiorari in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 109 S.
Ct. 3240 (1989) and Minnesota v. Hodgson, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). The Court also noted probable
jurisdiction in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989), and will
consider jurisdiction in Turnock v. Ragsdale, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (1989).
2. This question arises not only with respect to abortion but also in a variety of other settings.
For example, it is the crux of the issues of capital punishment, suicide, rejection of medical treatment
on religious grounds, and right-to-die. The Supreme Court recently addressed the constitutionality
of executing mentally retarded persons in Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2944-69 (1989), and
persons who committed crimes at the age of 16 or 17 in Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2974-
94 (1989). During the 1989-1990 term, the Court will address the right-to-die question in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 495 (1989).
3. Having abandoned the quest for unity of aesthetic or philosophical vision, the postmodern
sensibility may regard this question as not only hopelessly opaque but pointless even to ask. Such
regard, however, says more about the emptiness of the postmodern outlook than the enduring value
of the question. For a discussion of how the postmodern viewpoint often evades any genuine strug-
gle with weighty questions, see Gitlin, Postmodernism: Roots and Politics, in CULTURAL POLITICS
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 347, 349-50 (I. Angus & S. Jhally eds. 1989). For explanations of the
postmoder sensibility and evaluations of its influence on legal scholarship, see Calhoun, Social The-
ory and the Law: Systems Theory, Normative Justification, and Postmodernism, 83 Nw. U.L. REv.
398, 441-58 (1989); Frankenburg, Down by Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason, 83 Nw. U.L. REV.
360, 371-75 (1989). See also Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEXAS L.
REV. 1195, 1217-20 (1989) (describing postmodernism as one of four incommensurable cognitive
frameworks used in legal discourse).
866
Corporate Life and Corporate Law
dealing with large bureaucratic organizations 4-be they governmental
bodies or business corporations-deals less with what should be done
than with how or by whom key matters should be decided.5 This focus on
second-order process matters works tolerably well, provided there exists
at least some implicit consensus on the basic thrust of collective action.
6
Yet, as in an individual's life, occasions arise when those involved in
an organization must do more than head in the same assumed direction
pursuant to some seemingly agreed-upon division of responsibility.
There are times when they must attend more explicitly to the reason for
their union. Even then, however, the question of the essential meaning of
the organization's existence may quickly be transmuted into a question of
process-not What do we do? but Who decides what we do? An even
prior question is-Who decides who decides?
7
Today, one particular form of organization-the publicly held busi-
ness corporation--confronts the most basic question of all, the question
of its reason for being. Deliberation over the meaning of corporate exist-
ence is being forced into the open for a simple reason: the current hos-
tile-takeover climate makes it inescapable. Whether for good or bad, the
hostile-takeover phenomenon profoundly and undeniably disrupts the ac-
tivities of many large corporations. The disruption affects not only those
companies that are actually taken over, but also those that succeed in
resisting, and even those that only suspect they might become targets of
takeover bids.8 Few corporations escape untouched. As a result, all per-
4. For a critique of legal doctrine associated with two types of American bureaucratic form-
business corporations and administrative agencies--see Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in Ameri-
can Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1296-376 (1984).
5. Professor Frug emphasizes that courts seek to control discretion by policing the procedures
rather than the substance of bureaucratic decision making. See id. at 1343-53. For a description of
how insistence on procedural fastidiousness has come to characterize judicial review of corporate
decision making, see Branson, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Director Liability, 24
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 99-103 (1989). For an argument that courts use the rhetoric of proce-
dural care to conduct higher substantive review of corporate-director conduct, see Palmiter, Re-
shaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEXAS L. REv. 1351,
1389-94 (1989).
6. Professor James Q. Wilson's study of bureaucracies concludes that successful bureaucracies
know exactly what their mission is while unsuccessful bureaucracies work toward ill-defined or even
nonexistent objectives. See J. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
WHY THEY Do IT 109-10 (1989).
7. In another context, Professor Stanley Fish has recognized the importance of who gets to
decide answers to legal questions: "After all, the crucial question, which returns the original prob-
lem to center stage, still has to be asked: Who gets to make the rules? And once that question is
answered, another question (it is really the same) waits behind it: Who gets to say who gets to make
the rules?" Fish, Force, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 883, 884 (1988).
8. Professor Coffee has asserted that "the more important impact of the takeover [phenome-
non) may well be on those firms and managers who are not taken over, but who change their behav-
ior as a result of the general deterrent threat of a takeover." Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers:
The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 41 (1986). For evidence supporting that
assertion, see id. at 41-60.
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sons associated with these organizations-whether as senior managers,
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, or recipients of tax revenues
or corporate largesse-must remain mindful of how swiftly and thor-
oughly a takeover might alter the enterprise and destabilize their lives.9
Because they are such a powerful force, takeovers have generated an un-
ending torrent of controversy.10 For many years, members of a diverse
but relatively small group have hotly disputed the causes, impact, and
value of takeovers." Two interesting features suffuse this debate. First,
while most people affected by takeovers no doubt have strong opinions
on the subject, they are not direct participants in this discussion. In-
stead, the debate has been confined to the ranks of corporate execu-
tives,12 economists,13 legislators,14 institutional investors,
15 lawyers,' 6
9. For a brief account of how William Farley's recent takeover of West Point-Pepperell jarred
the town of West Point, Georgia and its residents, see Bruck, The World of Business, THE NEW
YORKER, Aug. 7, 1989, at 76, 83-84. RJR Nabisco made substantial cuts in its work force following
its leveraged buyout. Morris, RJR, in'Long-Awaited Move, to Dismiss About 12% of Workers at
Tobacco Unit, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1989, at A3, col. 2. Even defensive "victors" in takeover battles
lay off employees. For example, Prime Computer, Inc. announced that "it would lay off 2,500
employees, or nearly 20 percent of its work force, as part of a restructuring designed to put the
company back on its feet following a 10-month anti-takeover battle." Pugh, Prime Computer to Lay
Off20% of Staff in Restructuring, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1989, at D4, col. 1. Evidence of job loss
associated with hostile takeovers, although scant, is emerging. See Halverson, First the Merger, Then
the Job Cuts, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 4, 1989, at 9, col. 2. Empirical evidence of the effects of
takeover activity on nonshareholders other than employees is lacking.
10. One recent indication of the discontent associated with takeovers, especially highly lever-
aged acquisitions, is the flurry of congressional activity following the highly publicized RJR Nabisco
deal. By January of 1989, "nine congressional committees had announced they would hold hear-
ings." Holland & Novak, Buyouts-The LBO Lobby Makes Its Move on Washington, COMMON
CAUSE, Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 13, 15.
11. Certain facets of this debate are treated in recent works. See CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (A. Auerbach ed. 1988) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAKEOVERS]; Hos-
TILE TAKEOVERS: ISSUES IN PUBLIC AND CORPORATE POLICY (D. McKee ed. 1989) [hereinafter
HOSTILE TAKEOVERS]; KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKE-
OVER (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds. 1988); THE U.S. BUSINESS CORPORATION
(J. Meyer & J. Gustafson eds. 1988).
12. For the views of several outspoken business critics of hostile takeovers, see Hennessey, Cor-
porate Restructuring: The Fast Buck-Or Faith in the Future?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGANIZA-
TIONAL TRANSFORMATION: MERGERS, TAKEOVERS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 12, 13
(1987) [hereinafter ETHICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION] (Summary of the Seventh Na-
tional Conference on Business Ethics) (copy on file with the Texas Law Review); Mercer, Burial of
the Golden Rule?, in ETHICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION, supra, at 4,4-5; Norris, The
Ethics of Organizational Transformation in Takeovers, Plant Closings, and Cooperative Ventures, in
ETHICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION, supra, at 14, 15; Sigler, What Is a Corporation's
Responsibility in the U.S. Today?, in ETHICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION, supra, at 16,
16.
13. The already large body of economics literature on corporate takeovers is increasing rapidly.
Professors Gilson and Kraakman's 1989 supplement to Professor Ronald Gilson's casebook on ac-
quisitions, R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS (1986), contains
extensive references to financial and economic studies and literature. See R. GILSON & R. KRAAK-
MAN, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS (Supp. 1989).
14. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
15. The Council of Institutional Investors, a coalition of pension funds, has adopted a share-
holder "bill of rights" to reassert the role of investors in corporate decision making and to make
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and scholars of various stripes. 17 As with many other contemporary is-
sues, one wonders whether these participants adequately reflect the views
of those whose affairs are really at stake and whether the law can or
should take account of such views through less visible channels.
18
The second important feature of the debate is that although certain
propositions made about takeovers in these discussions are uncontest-
able,19 the participants have reached no real consensus on the overarch-
ing question of whether high levels of takeover activity are, overall, good
or bad for the nation.20 This key issue remains highly divisive, and its
two sides serve to cabin a wide array of subarguments for and against
corporate management more accountable to shareholders, especially in takeovers. See Vise, "Bill of
Rights" Seeks to Boost Power of Shareholders, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1986, at Fl, col. 1. Professor
Conard lists other examples of institutional investor activism on takeover-related issues. See Con-
ard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 131-52 (1989).
16. The most outspoken practicing lawyers have been those who customarily represent target
companies. See, e.g., Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 11-35, 59-69 (1987) (examining the current trend of "abusive" takeover techniques and
proposing reforms in corporate governance); Trevor, Hostile Takeovers: A US. Falkland Islands
Where the Argentines Always Win, in HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, supra note 11, at 16, 27 (criticizing the
arguments for hostile takeovers and concluding that the legislature should pass an "Abolition of
Tender Offers Act").
17. Academicians in the fields of law, finance, economics, sociology, public policy, and ethics
have studied and debated the subject of hostile takeovers. See supra note 11. Recently, the Church
of England has begun exploring the issue from a theological perspective. See INDUTRIAL AND
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS COMM., GEN. SYNOD BD. FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, CHURCH OF ENG-
LAND, THE ETHICS OF ACQUISITION: A DISCUSSION OF THE DILEMMAS AND HUMAN CONSE-
QUENCES OF MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS 1-2 (1989) [hereinafter THE ETHICS OF ACQUISITION].
18. As expressed by Professor Tribe: "For it is the most vulnerable, the most forgotten, whose
perspective is least akin to that of the lawmaker or judge or bureaucrat and whose fate is most
forcefully determined by the law's overall design-by its least visible, most deeply imbedded gaps
and deflections." Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1989). For examples of how, in the related area of
plant closings, those persons most dramatically affected by a transaction may have no voice in the
matter, see Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 614-51 (1988) and Roger
& Me (Dog Eat Dog Films 1989).
19. For example, it is clear that target-company shareholders gain substantially. See Black &
Grundfest, Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restructurings Between 1981 and 1986: $162
Billion Is a Lot of Money, 1 CONTINENTAL BANK J. APPLIED CORP. FIN, 5, 8 (1988); Jarrell,
Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J.
EcON. PERSP. 49, 51-53 (1988) [hereinafter Jarrell]; Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 10-16 (1983).
20. One obvious reason for the lack of consensus on this larger question is an absence of agree-
ment on the relevant criterion for measuring the national interest. The discipline of economics pro-
vides the notion of "allocative efficiency," and much of the takeover debate has focused on the
efficiency effects of takeover activity. Even assuming that the thin notion of efficiency adequately
captures the national interest, however, economists cannot agree on whether high levels of takeover
activity in fact advance that goal. Compare Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, HARV. BUS.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 109, 120 (arguing that "scientific evidence indicates that activities in the
market for corporate control almost uniformly increase efficiency") with Fortier, Hostile Takeovers
and the Market for Corporate Control, ECON. PERSP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 2, 12 ("Research does not
provide clear support for the hypothesis that there are real efficiency gains from takeovers.... Only
with additional research can the social and economic welfare implications and policy directives re-
garding hostile takeovers be more precisely drawn.").
869
Texas Law Review Vol. 68:865, 1990
takeovers. The persisting discord on this critical point prevents the one
governmental body designed to take a broad-gauged view of social
problems-Congress-from addressing this subject with real conviction.
Paralyzed by uncertainty,21 Congress continues, as it has for years, to
study and wring its hands over the takeover issue, while reliably failing to
take any significant action.
22
In the face of congressional muteness, the duty to structure the legal
environment in which takeover battles unfold has fallen to the states.
State legislators have not hesitated to express their opinions about take-
overs and have routinely enacted laws aimed at equipping corporate
management to fulfill what lawmakers vaguely see as the fundamental
purpose of corporate activity.23 These efforts continue to be controver-
sial on grounds of both policy and theory,24 and they have only recently
21. The Interim Report of the Commission to Review Massachusetts Anti-Takeover Laws
commented on congressional inaction on the takeover issue:
During the eight years of the current national administration there appears to have been a
trend in the Executive branch toward treating the idea of regulating takeovers itself as a
threat to market integrity. It is less clear that Congress shares this view. However, given
the complexity of the issues and the limited availability of reliable data, the federal govern-
ment has been reluctant to act.
While it is easy to criticize their failure to act decisively, their lack of action
appears to be a function of the failure of any set of proposals to emerge as clearly "right."
1 Interim Report of the Commission to Review Massachusetts Anti-Takeover Laws, 30, 88 (1988)
(copy on file with the Texas Law Review).
22. One notable exception not addressed specifically to takeovers was the 1988 Worker Adjust-
ment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, §§ 2(a), 3, 102 Stat. 890, 890-92 (1988)
(to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2102) (requiring employers with 100 or more employees to give 60 days
notice prior to certain layoffs). In addition, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 limited
the ability of bidders to deduct interest immediately on debt instruments that accrue interest but do
not pay it to investors until maturity and the ability of lenders to exclude a portion of the interest
earned on loans made to companies to establish employee share ownership plans (ESOPs), a favorite
defensive measure. See H.R. 3200, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 5334 (1989). The effect
of these tax measures on takeover activity is not clear, but the latter measure is not expected to
dramatically alter the appeal of ESOPs in leveraged buyouts. See Belford & Greenberg, New Bill
Cuts Back Tax Benefits of ESOPs in LBO Transactions, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 16, 1989, at 16, col. 2. For a
collection of the myriad takeover bills introduced into Congress over the past several years, see
Conard, supra note 15, at 126 n.30.
Believers in public choice theory would explain congressional inaction on the takeover front as
understandable because even though legislative initiative might please certain groups, it would alien-
ate many others. Thus, members of Congress act rationally in doing nothing, and thereby they
succeed in their quest to "maximize the total support they receive by alienating as few groups as
possible." Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46 (1988). The efforts of persons involved in the leveraged buyout industry to
use campaign contributions to continue congressional failure to regulate leveraged acquisitions is
chronicled by Holland & Novak, supra note 10.
23. The chief aim of state antitakeover legislation is to advance the welfare of local enterprise-
dependent nonshareholder interests, not the well-being of shareholders. See Johnson & Millon, Mis-
reading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1862, 1862-65, 1878-82 (1989) [hereinafter Misreading
the Williams Act]; Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 846, 848 (1989) [hereinafter Missing the Point].
24. Recently, Professor Macey sought to develop a framework for assessing the claim (which he
rejects) that nonshareholder constituencies should receive protection under the auspices of corporate
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cleared formidable constitutional hurdles. 25 Although state takeover
statutes embody no detailed, fully developed theoretical conception of
corporate personality or purpose, legislators staunchly deny that a corpo-
ration is nothing more than an atomistic meeting ground for episodic
commercial exchange that, when facing a takeover threat, should cater to
the short-term wealth desires of shareholders. 26 Thus, at least regarding
what is not the ultimate meaning of corporate life, the thinking of state
legislators is clear, if crude, and they have designed their corporate take-
over statutes with the aim of deliberately renouncing the notion of share-
holder primacy. 27
These antitakeover statutes are quite disturbing to those whose eco-
nomic and legal beliefs are more orthodox, who think that corporate ac-
tivity, both in and out of the takeover context, ought to focus exclusively
on the well-being of shareholders. 28 The overall impact of these statutes
on the level and tempo of takeover activity is limited, however, because
the takeover statute of the most important corporate-law state-Dela-
ware-is not as invincible as others.29 Consequently, the Delaware stat-
law. See Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fun-
damental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 173-75. Macey's article is a response to the
proliferation of both state antitakeover statutes and commentary advocating management considera-
tion of nonshareholder interests in making corporate decisions. See id. at 174. In this respect, the
article stands as a thoughtful attempt to seriously rebut the reasoning behind those statutes and
commentary rather than simply dismissing those positions as so uninformed and unfortunate as not
to warrant extended comment. See Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78
GEo. L.J. 71, 140-50 (1989) (asserting that the board of directors' discretion in resisting takeover
attempts should not be interpreted to allow protection of nonshareholder interest). In spite of aca-
demic criticism, state legislators, buoyed by legal success, see infra note 25, continue to consider
increasingly stringent measures. See Geyelin & Goel, Pennsylvania Legislators Gird To Battle Over
Bill That Could Become Stiffest Anti-Takeover Law, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1989, at A16, col. I (dis-
cussing a proposed law that would compel transfer of raider profits to the target company if a
takeover bid fails, allow directors to weigh interests other than shareholders', limit shareholder vot-
ing rights, and guarantee severance pay).
25. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 504-05, 508-09
(7th Cir.) (upholding Wisconsin takeover statute against constitutional attack on preemption and
commerce clause grounds), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989). See generally Johnson, The Eventual
Clash Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 35,
72-76 (1988) (discussing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), in which the
Supreme Court upheld Indiana's takeover statute against commerce and supremacy clause chal-
lenges); Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 23, at 1868-73, 1883-86, 1920-22 (discussing the
complexities of preemption analysis in determining the constitutionality of state takeover statutes).
26. See Missing the Point, supra note 23, at 848-50.
27. Professor Romano characterized state antitakeover statutes as "troublesome, for they can
produce results that are inconsistent with the core goal of corporation law-the maximization of
equity share prices." Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113
(1987).
28. See Johnson, State Takeover Statutes: Constitutionality, Community, and Heresy, 45 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1988) (describing as "heretical" those states that" 'corrupt' their corpo-
rate statutes by consciously deploying them to deter market forces such as hostile takeovers for the
good of local communities and resident noninvestors"); Romano, supra note 27.
29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988). For a brief description of the Delaware
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ute has not halted the takeover of Delaware corporations. In fact, from
the passage of the law in 1988 until the collapse of the junk bond market
in 1989, the pace of takeover activity appears to have quickened, and the
number of takeover-related decisions rendered by Delaware judges has
risen sharply.30 Therefore, not only has the task of speaking to the take-
statute, see Johnson, supra note 25, at 36 n.3. The statute was upheld against constitutional attack in
BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 473 (D. Del. 1988), and RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley
Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 488 (D. Del 1988).
30. The Delaware judiciary addressed a number of takeover-related subjects in 1988 and 1989.
First, the judges continued to struggle with the reach of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding that when the sale of a company becomes
inevitable, the directors have a duty to ensure that shareholders receive maximum value for their
equity). Concern about the unexpected reach of Revlon arose out of a decision in the Delaware
federal district court finding that a defensive restructuring reducing public shareholder ownership
from 92.6% to 45.5% and increasing management's share from 4.8% to 23.9% constituted a "sale"
under Revlon. See Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 782 (D.
Del. 1988). Chancellor Allen sought to contain the Revlon decision in two important decisions. See
In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litig. (Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.), [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94514, at 93278-80 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (holding that a
merger agreement did not put the target company in a Revlon mode since it did not contemplate a
change in corporate control), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership
v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790-91 (Del. Ch.) (holding that the directors' implementation of a
restructuring plan did not breach any duties derivable from Revlon), appeal dismissed as moot, 556
A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). Second, the judges described how a target-company board is to conduct a
Revlon auction once in that mode. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1286-87 (Del. 1989) (concluding that directors are not required to follow any standard formula in
conducting an auction so long as their primary purpose is "the enhancement of the bidding process
for the benefit of the stockholders"); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94194, at 91715 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (holding that so long as
the selection of one of two substantially equivalent bids was done in a good-faith exercise of business
judgment, Revlon required no further steps).
Third, the judges addressed the validity of various defensive measures, including target-board
refusals to redeem poison pills. See, eg., Allen v. Prime Computer, Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 421 (Del.
1988) (enjoining bylaw amendment delaying effect of shareholder consent for a minimum of 20
days); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 285-91 (Del. Ch. 1989) (upholding
defensive strategy of ESOP, which included the sale of shares to a friendly party and to make a
subsequent tender offer for the stock); TW Services, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94334, at 92182 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (refusing to force redemption of
poison pill); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 276 (Del. Ch. 1989) (uphold-
ing issuance of shares to ESOP); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94181, at 91645 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (enjoining lockup and
termination fee and reimbursement provisions of merger agreement); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime
Computer, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94179, at 91635 (Del. Ch. Dec.
20, 1988) (refusing to force redemption of poison pill); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co.,
558 A.2d 1049, 1061 (Del. Ch. 1988) (ordering target company to redeem poison pill); City Capital,
551 A.2d at 801-03 (interpreting Revlon to require only a good-faith, well-informed determination of
a company's value by any reasonable means); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 682, 686
(Del. Ch. 1988) (refusal to force redemption of poison pill); In re Damon Corp. Stockholders Litig.,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94040, at 90872 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (same);
In re Amsted Indus., Inc. Litig., 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 611, 621-23 (Del. Ch. 1988) (reviewing a board
decision not to shop the company in approving the settlement of suits arising from a management-
sponsored leveraged buyout); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 699,
718-21 (Del. Ch. 1988) (reviewing a board decision not to announce an interest in selling the com-
pany in a suit by shareholders claiming breach of Revlon duties); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,
564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (invalidating board action of expanding board membership to
thwart implementation of dissident shareholder's recapitalization plan); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc.
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over phenomenon centered on state rather than federal forums, the true
locus of power has shifted from the legislative branch to the Delaware
judiciary.
When asked to resolve complex but seemingly narrow legal ques-
tions arising in high-profile takeover battles, the Delaware courts are do-
ing much more than deciding who wins and loses control over
Pillsbury, 31 Polaroid,32 and Time.3 3 More importantly, a handful of
judges are, in effect, empowered to shape (or reshape) the entire corpo-
rate landscape and to answer the most fundamental question of all-
what is the meaning of corporate endeavor?34 Beyond the startling fact
that such a crucial chore rests, for the most part uncontroversially, 35 in
the hands of a select, not especially diverse, set of unelected persons,
3 6
this development is intriguing for at least two reasons.
First, one would think such a fundamental question would need no
resolution. Surely we all know, do we not, the chief purposes of corpo-
rate activity? In truth, the question, like similar questions about the
meaning of individual life, is rarely contemplated in the frenzy of every-
day living; usually, only an unexpected calamity provokes such an in-
v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1247 (Del. Ch. 1988) (enjoining defensive restructuring); Facet Enter., Inc.
v. Prospect Group, Inc., 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 310, 320-21 (Del. Ch. 1988) (permitting retention of
poison pill to facilitate auction). For a discussion of the knotty issues the Delaware judiciary must
grapple with after the Paramount decision, see Johnson & Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus.
LAW. (forthcoming August 1990).
31. See Grand Metro., 558 A.2d at 1050, 1061.
32. See Shamrock Holdings, 559 A.2d at 269-70.
33. See Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed, Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94514, at 93265 (Del.
Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
34. Martin Lipton, a well-known takeover lawyer, recently commented on the significance for
judges of congressional inaction on the takeover front in a way that recognized the root issue of
corporate purpose:
The failure to develop an effective national policy has left the problem in the hands of the
legal and financial advisors to corporate management.... Mhe field of battle [has moved]
from the market place to the courthouse.... [W]e must recognize the enterprise nature of
our major business corporations. They do not exist solely for the purpose of providing
transitory investment media for institutional investors. They exist to foster our continued
economic growth and progress. They are an integral part of the community.... Pending
the implementation of a national policy, the courts should recognize management's obliga-
tions to, and concerns for, all of its constituents--employees, customers, suppliers, and
communities, as well as stockholders.... Delaware, the home of half of our major corpo-
rations, must accept its responsibility to protect the nation against the ravages of the take-
over frenzy.
Lipton, Corporate Governance: Major Issues for the 1990s, 20 DIVIDEND 2, 6-7 (1989).
35. But see Fiflis, Of Lollipops and Law-A Proposal for a National Policy Concerning Tender
Offer Defenses, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 303, 306 (1986) (asserting that "[o]ne may properly ask
whether it is appropriate for Delaware... to fix national policy in an international securities market,
while Congress and the federal courts, Nero-like, abdicate a policymaking role").
36. For a brief profile of the members of the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware
Supreme Court, see Meyers, Showdown in Delaware: The Battle to Shape Takeover Law, INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1989, at 64, 68-69.
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quiry.37 Surprisingly, not a single corporate statute explicitly addresses
the purpose of corporate activity.38 Thus, those who believe that a pro-
ject of this scale is best taken up by "public law"-that is, legisla-
tively39-- are met with silence. Moreover, judges have rarely, and then
quite cryptically or obliquely, spoken to the issue of corporate purpose.4°
Whence comes our thinking on this important subject? Perhaps for the
most part the purpose of corporate activity has been a self-evident propo-
sition, requiring no elaboration because it is such an integral and deep-
seated part of our social fabric.41 Takeovers, however, have introduced a
37. Martin Heidegger's monumental analytic on the meaning of being describes the way in
which humans, although capable of what he calls authentic existence, often live inauthentically by
falling into the beguiling and seeming completeness of "everydayness" and its accompanying charac-
teristics of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. See M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 210-24 (J.
MacQuarrie & E. Robinson trans. 1962). For Heidegger, the uncanniness of anxiety (angst) sporadi-
cally and usefully retrieves one from absorption in the world and brings one face to face with the
possibility of authenticity. See id. at 230-35.
38. An American Bar Association task force realized this point when it was asked to "consider
the extent to which antitakeover initiatives may be availed of under the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act ('MBCA')." Takeover Defense Task Force of the Comm. on Corporate Laws,
Model Business Corporation Act: Implications for Takeover Contests, 42 Bus. LAw. 575, 575 (1987).
In briefly considering whether directors could consider the interests of nonshareholders in respond-
ing to takeovers, the task force wistfully observed that "nothing in the MBCA appears to specify
'profit' as an objective of business corporations. Perhaps this goal was assumed." Id. at 581; cf
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01, at 25-28
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) (indicating that a business corporation's objective should be to enhance
corporate profit and shareholder gain).
39. See, e.g., Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover
Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 779 (1988) (asserting that "[the resolution
of this debate belongs in Congress, and in the state legislatures, and in the capital markets").
40. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 42-44, 50-52.
41. A wonderful example is found in an oft-cited Michigan Supreme Court case addressing the
question of corporate purpose:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stock-
holders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to obtain that end and does not extend to
a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of profits
among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.... [I]t is not within the
lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for
the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting
others ....
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919). Interestingly, the court
failed to cite any authority for its statements, and one can rightly ask what the court looks to and
relies on in making such important (normative) observations about the corporate institution.
Although many people agree with the court's statements, the important jurisprudential point is not
the substance of such judicial assertions, but their origins and their provisional rather than essential
nature. The question of corporate purpose, then, can and must be visited anew by the law, just as it
was visited by the Michigan court in a very limited context in 1919. To reject such an inquiry as off
limits because of a belief that the matter has somehow been settled once and for all is historical error.
See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. In addition, rejecting an inquiry on those grounds
embraces the
profoundly flawed.., notion that there exists a natural, pre-political and pre-legal state of
things.., and that the process of making and interpreting law has no effect on that "natu-
ral" background.... If ... things seem "natural," is it not only by virtue of an entire
background of legal arrangements[;] ... not by an inexorable order of nature, but by a set
of prior legal observations that have changed the very universe being observed.
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sizable measure of institutional doubt and angst. Now, someone must
speak to the issue of corporate purpose more methodically and conclu-
sively, testing the suppleness of conventional wisdom, and affirm or
abandon it. In our legal culture, Delaware judges possess the most au-
thoritative voice; they decide.
Second, the question of ultimate institutional meaning is not posed
directly. No litigant and no Delaware judge has ever identified the issue
before the court as the meaning of corporate existence. Instead, the ques-
tion that has emerged as central to Delaware's corporate jurisprudence
appears to be more modest: What are the respective roles of target com-
pany shareholders and directors in resolving takeover contests? 42 This
question has come to command a critical place in takeover battles be-
cause the language in which takeover issues are framed is the somewhat
anemic vernacular of contemporary corporate law. For almost sixty
years,43 corporate law, or more narrowly corporate governance, has been
preoccupied with the important problem of mending a potential rift be-
tween legal theory and reality: if shareholders are the chief beneficiaries
of corporate activity-as legal orthodoxy holds-how does the law en-
sure that managers of publicly held corporations conscientiously operate
those organizations to maximize shareholder wealth? Takeovers hold
enormous promise for rectifying this predicament and, quite understand-
ably, they are eagerly embraced. 44 The danger is that the irksome ac-
countability problem flowing from the separation of ownership and
Tribe, supra note 18, at 31-32.
42. The proper roles of management and shareholders in resolving takeovers has puzzled judges
because hostile takeovers are neither purely "corporate enterprise" matters nor simply stock disposi-
tion matters. To the extent an action involves the "corporation," management participates because
it is charged with operating corporate affairs. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1983). To the
extent a matter involves disposition of stock, shareholders generally decide. Because hostile take-
overs involve both stock disposition and corporate affairs-that is, control over the enterprise is
gained by purchasing a substantial amount of stock-both shareholders and managers claim a role.
See Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 23, at 1914-15. Obviously, the issue of characterization
has proven to be an enormous stumbling block, especially because plausible shareholder wealth-
enhancing arguments can be made on behalf of managerial involvement. Although this governance
issue has generated most of the discourse on corporate takeovers, academic commentators generally
have failed to address the extent to which resolution of the governance issue ultimately depends on
judicial notions of institutional meaning, notions that cannot be presupposed to be identical to the
simplifying assumptions of corporate theory.
43. Management accountability to shareholders-the abiding concern of modern corporate
governance-was systematically treated by Berle and Means in their classic 1932 work. See A.
BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY passim (1932).
44. See, e.g., Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 841 (1981) (noting that in some circumstances "the rmarket
for corporate control may be the only potentially serious force for limiting management discretion");
Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL
L. RE v. 1, 27 (1984) (asserting that "the market for corporate control in general, and tender offers in




management in the modem public corporation, although significant,
threatens to eclipse a prior and more important question-the underlying
purpose of corporate activity. In other words, by stubbornly insisting
that management focus exclusively on shareholder welfare, corporate
law's dogma may well succeed in checking management's broad discre-
tion. That success, however, may come at the expense of preordaining
the answer to the more fundamental question of whether the single-
minded apotheosis of capital providers is in fact the proper aim of corpo-
rate endeavor.
Thus, the takeover inquiry at first seems a narrow one to be con-
ducted within the limited intellectual province of corporate law. Exam-
ining the subject from a vantage point, however, illuminates a deeper
issue: Is the manner in which takeovers serve to secure management al-
legiance to shareholder interests consistent with the rightful expectations
and demands that other groups in society place upon corporate activity?
If not, then takeovers represent the fulfillment of a Faustian wager in
which they deliver a measure of good (for shareholders and corporate
law) in return for the loss of something greater. Currently there is no
national consensus on that larger question.45 Yet, impelled by the fre-
netic dynamics of hostile-takeover contests, and more hindered than
helped by the hidebound manner in which corporate law has cast take-
over questions, the Delaware judiciary is inexorably supplying its own
halting answer to this elemental matter.
This Article argues that in the guise of evaluating the propriety of
various defensive measures in specific takeover battles, the Delaware ju-
diciary is deciding the foundational question of corporate purpose. More
cogently, it is deciding whether one particular vision of corporate pur-
pose-a radically proshareholder vision-will emerge as the predomi-
nant view. The Delaware judiciary is engaged in this important task
even though it appears to be answering only the much narrower question
of the proper balance of power between shareholders and managers, and
even though it uses the traditional vocabulary of corporate-law doctrine,
a language designed to deal with issues of corporate governance, not cor-
porate purpose. The handling of this whole matter will, of course, be
important for calming the current unrest in the field of corporate law,
but it has other dimensions as well. It carries enormous repercussions
45. See supra note 20. Not only is there no national consensus, there is no international consen-
sus. As takeover activity increases in the United Kingdom and as it is expected to rise dramatically
in Europe after 1992, fundamental questions about takeovers and their effects are being asked abroad
as well as in the United States. See, e.g., THE ETHICS OF ACQUISITION, supra note 17, at 12-13
(noting the tension between the United Kingdom's need to remain competitive in the world market
and the desire to protect local communities and employees).
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for our collective sense of what we take to be the point of participation in
large corporations by forcing us to confront the issue of whether we ac-
cept shareholder enrichment as the supreme end of such effort. Given
the interconnectedness of our work and personal lives, the institutional
answer inevitably spills into and colors our sense of individual meaning
as well.
4 6
From the standpoint of legal theory, the judiciary's treatment of the
takeover issue can enhance our understanding of the relationship be-
tween legal doctrine and the underlying social norms and aspirations that
ultimately animate that doctrine.47 It offers an accessible means of ex-
ploring the role of judges in mediating the interplay between the rigid
preconceptions of conventional legal doctrine and dimmer but broadly
based social values.48 For example, most persons in this country proba-
bly would be astounded to hear that maximization of shareholder wealth
46. The late cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker, in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book The De-
nial of Death, asserted that each human being has a deep-seated longing to "justify himself as an
object of primary value in the universe [and to] make the biggest possible contribution to world life."
E. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 4 (1973). To believe that one's work is not meaningful, or that
it is easily dispensed with, can only impair one's sense of personal well-being. Chancellor William
Allen touched on this issue in the recent Paramount decision: "Many people commit a huge portion
of their lives to a single large-scale business organization. They derive their identity in part from
that organization and feel that they contribute to the identity of the firm." In re Time Inc. Share-
holders Litig. (Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.), [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94514, at 93269 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
47. See M. EISENBERO, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1, 14-161 (1988). Professor
Eisenberg distinguishes between what he calls "doctrinal proposition" and "social propositions."
Doctrinal propositions include those "propositions that purport to state legal rules and are found in
or easily derived from textual sources that are generally taken to express legal doctrine." Id. at 1.
Social propositions are much broader and include moral propositions, policy propositions, and expe-
riential propositions. See id. at 14-42. Eisenberg addresses the way in which these divergent sets of
propositions interact. See id. at 43-145. His work, then, attempts the daunting task, which other
prominent scholars such as Llewellyn, Hart, Dworkin, and Unger have addressed from a variety of
vantage points, of articulating the nature of law and law making. See id. at 146-61. Professor
Schauer's book review summarizes the way in which Eisenberg's work fits into this larger enterprise.
See Schauer, Is the Common Law Law? (Book Review), 77 CALIF. L. REV. 455, 460-71 (1989)
[hereinafter Schauer, Book Review]; see also Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 537-38, 548
(1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism] (demonstrating that common notions of formalism are best
understood as processes by which legal rules take on meaning and arguing that criticizing legal
reasoning as formalistic tends to obscure the normative political, social, moral, and economic choices
that are truly at issue).
In discussing what Eisenberg calls "social propositions," this Article uses the term "norms"
rather than "propositions" because the word "propositions" carries an overly rational connotation.
Admittedly, whatever their nonrational origins, we cannot discuss norms unless at some point we
express them in language. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that these norms are not always
rational in origins or character, and they are keenly influential even when not formed into proposi-
tions. Cf. White, What Can a Lawyer Learn From Literature? (Book Review), 102 HARV. L. REV.
2014, 2016-20 (1989) (noting the structural coerciveness in analytic discourse and asserting that we
have come to view the center of any text as propositional in nature).
48. One advantage of a full public discussion of a controversial subject from a variety of van-
tage points, see supra note 17, is that it conveys to judges a sense of what various groups think about
a novel subject in light of traditional norms.
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is the raison d'etre of corporate existence, yet corporate doctrine takes
that focus for granted. Whether it is proper to invoke social traditions
and consensus 49 and whether it is possible to measure them are of im-
mense importance to the common-law process and the stinging decon-
structionist critique to which it has been subjected.50 Moreover, the
dialectical way in which legal decisions not only draw on, but in turn
alter, the larger social terrain deserves greater attention.5
1
This Article's approach to making sense of Delaware's takeover de-
cisions is to partially "disassemble" corporate law's core premise of
shareholder primacy. It begins this task in a general, ruminative way in
Part II and then, drawing on the doctrinal exposition of Part III, finishes
the task with specific reference to takeover law in Part IV. This Article,
however, adamantly rejects a full-blown deconstructive slant on corpo-
rate law. Such an account fails to appreciate that at times of institutional
and doctrinal strain, Delaware's judges necessarily and properly draw on
norms from outside the limited domain of corporate-law precepts and
creatively "reassemble" those precepts to reach outcomes that reflect
larger values. Thus, although to a committed deconstructionist the reso-
lution of key legal contests appears to involve only a few powerful par-
ticipants quarreling over the application of seemingly indeterminate
rules, the common-law method provides a channel by which the beliefs of
a wide segment of society can be brought to bear on this and other signif-
icant social issues. Without this access, it is not just the legitimacy of
corporate managers that ought to concern us, but also that of judges.
II. The Province of Corporate Law
A. The Shareholder-Manager Axis
As a specialized field of study, contemporary corporate law has a
tightly bounded and overtly normative realm of concern. To quote from
the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance:
The challenge for corporate law is to facilitate the development of
a corporate structure that allows management the discretion to
utilize its expertise on behalf of shareholders, but at the same time
49. Justice Scalia recently injected the notion of social consensus into constitutional adjudica-
tion. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
50. For a description of the deconstructive method, see A. HUTCHINSON, DWELLING ON THE
THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT 35-41 (1988); Balkin, Deconstruc-
tive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 746-72 (1987). The deconstructive strategy is
often associated with the larger postmodern outlook described in Schlag, supra note 3, but its critical
and interpretive insights can be drawn on in particular settings without also abandoning (as does
postmodernism) the quest for shared understandings.
51. See Tribe, supra note 18, at 20.
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guards against situations in which management might utilize that
discretion to favor itself at the expense of shareholders. 52
This scheme includes only two visible parties: management, that small
group of business experts charged with the responsibility of operating
corporate affairs; and shareholders, the designated beneficiaries of man-
agement's efforts. The relationship of these two parties forms the twin
strands of corporate-law doctrine: (1) the corporation is operated by
management, but (2) for the primary good of shareholders. In turn,
these strands mark the outer limits of the corporate-law domain.53 Other
participants in corporate affairs are remanded to public law54 or to the
institution of private contract 55 for recognition of their claims.
Thus, many commentators believe that the proper end of corporate
activity is clear and uncontroversial. 56 They further believe that the real
52. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS pt. 6, at
2 (Discussion Draft No. 2 1989).
53. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 30 (1986). Corporate law, like other intellectual disci-
plines, uses what Thomas Kuhn calls a paradigm to shape its inquiry. See T. KUHN, THE STRUC-
TURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970). For an attempt to apply Kuhn's insights to
constitutional law, see Tribe, supra note 18, at 23-39. Kuhn defines a paradigm as the "universally
recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a com-
munity of practitioners." T. KUHN, supra, at viii. He also believes that paradigms are necessary to
guide and speed investigation, and that
research scarcely begins before a scientific community thinks it has acquired firm answers
to questions like the following: ... What questions may be legitimately asked... and what
techniques employed in seeking solutions? ... [W]e shall wonder whether research could
proceed without such [conceptual] boxes, whatever the element of arbitrariness in their
historic origins, and occasionally, in their subsequent development.
Id. at 4-5. Likewise, corporate law could not proceed to investigate various questions without first
defining the range of its investigation. However useful, occasionally paradigms unduly constrict
vision, and therefore, even when refined, they can fail to account for certain problems. When a
paradigm is called into serious question, it is either retooled or discarded in favor of another. Kuhn
believes that paradigm breakdown is evidenced by the "proliferation of competing articulations, the
willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent, [and] the recourse to philosophy
and to debate over fundamentals." Id. at 91.
The law's struggle with the hostile-takeover phenomenon reveals the limits of the dominant
shareholder-centered paradigm of corporate law. Moreover, the contractual theory of the corpora-
tion that has recently attracted so much attention, see infra section II(C)(2), is evidence of paradigm
dissatisfaction. This theory, however, is a retooling, rather than a discarding, of the core premises of
corporate law.
54. See R. CLARK, supra note 53, at 680.
55. See id.; Macey, supra note 24, at 176-77.
56. See, eg., Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DUKE L.J. 54, 83 (stating
the author's decision to "assume, as all of the caselaw and most of the theoretical discussions do,
that takeover regulation exists to maximize benefit to target shareholders"). Professor Yablon is
mistaken about the goal of state legislative regulation of takeovers. See Missing the Point, supra note
23. As this Article argues, Professor Yablon is also mistaken about the meaning of judge-made
corporate takeover law, but he correctly expresses the dominant belief. Cf Lodge & Walton, The
American Corporation and Its New Relationships, CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 1989, at 9, 20-21 (as-
serting that "the old premise of corporate purpose and governance is no longer valid [and that] we
are now undergoing the transition to the new premise where the corporation's purpose is to serve all
of its constituents-customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, debt holders, and communities-
in a balanced way").
879
Texas Law Review Vol.' 68:865, 1990
burden of twentieth-century corporate law is to devise the best means for
securing the undoubted goal of shareholder well-being. Various theoreti-
cal models of the corporation have been propounded to guide this pro-
ject. Differences in conceptualization, however, do not preclude
agreement on certain basic points. Most scholars realistically accept the
fact that the intended beneficiaries of corporate endeavor do not and can-
not manage the organization themselves. Many make the somewhat
more objectionable-and paradoxical--claim that shareholders might be
better served by a looser rather than a tighter tether on management
activities.57 Building from these premises, the function of the law ap-
pears quite modest: it should confer a sufficiently wide berth of discre-
tion to enable management to operate creatively and flexibly but should
not be so broad that management can subvert the ultimate objective of
shareholder welfare. These dual strands of management discretion and
shareholder welfare are in constant tension, and each is poised on any
given issue to check, if not negate and overwhelm, the other.5 8
B. The Source of the Shareholder-Primacy Norm
Merely describing the compass of corporate law does not explain
why maximization of shareholder well-being is taken to be the supreme
purpose of corporate activity, a purpose privileged above all others.5 9 At
other times in our society it was not.60 In other societies it still is
57. Much of the contemporary corporate-law scholarship can be understood as a debate over
whether management possesses too much or too little discretion for the optimal welfare of share-
holders. For a summary of two different schools of thought on how much constraint the law should
impose on managers, see Weiss & White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors'
Reaction to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 551, 551-59 (1987).
58. Professor Frug makes this same point regarding both corporate law and administrative law,
see Frug, supra note 4, at 1289, and corporate-law scholars should not, as many have, ignore Frug's
trenchant analysis. On the question discussed in this Article, Professor Frug errs in his uncritical
acceptance of the limited and self-proclaimed domain of corporate law and his refusal to see that for
the topics traditionally dealt with by corporate law, it is useful to temporarily compartmentalize the
commercial world in an effort to understand it. In other words, he takes for granted that the struc-
ture of corporate law is always as bounded as most commentators contend, and then he proceeds to
debunk it for being so narrow in scope. This Article concedes that the narrow focus of corporate law
works well for many traditional governance issues but argues that many factors from outside the
domain of corporate law work to inform corporate doctrine when that doctrine confronts new phe-
nomena (such as takeovers). As the influence of those factors is fitfully worked into conventional
doctrine, it may appear as though doctrine oscillates irrationally. Yet it is irrational only if one
attempts to explain all corporate doctrine in terms of the constricted shareholder-manager frame-
c*'work. By appreciating the way in which considerations other than shareholder welfare are at work
vn shaping corporate precepts when the root issue of institutional purpose is implicated (as in take-
overs), the field of corporate law can appear as more open than many traditional corporate scholars
believe but not as radically indeterminate-or as secure a bastion of prerogative-as Frug and other
deconstructionists assert.
59. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
60. See Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L.
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not. 61 Over the years, commentators have offered many rationales to
support this proposition, which I call the fundamental postulate, and this
Article does not recite or discuss all of them.62 Instead, because this
Article focuses on the origins of these rationales and why they are said to
be controlling on a common-law judge, the Article will consider only two
rationales.
1. Accountability.-Many observers argue that if corporate manag-
ers were free to consider factors other than shareholder-wealth max-
imization in formulating corporate policy outside the takeover context
63
or in devising defensive measures once in the takeover setting,64 they
would wield uncontrollable power and would be unaccountable. Ac-
cordingly, many believe that by requiring corporate management to fo-
cus on the attainment of a single objective, shareholders can more
carefully monitor its performance and hold it accountable. 65 For corpo-
rate law, then, shareholder welfare is the authoritative mark by which
the exercise of corporate power can be both evaluated and legitimized.
There are two different kinds of responses to this assertion. First,
even if accountability could be achieved only by requiring adherence to a
singular benchmark-a dubious position-it does not follow that share-
holder welfare is the only available benchmark.6 6 For example, the per-
REv. 903, 905-18 (1988) (discussing the two fundamentally different policy concerns of nineteenth-
century corporate law).
61. See Reich, Labor Law, Reform, and the Japanese Model (Book Review), 98 HARV. L. REV.
697, 705 (1985) (asserting that "[i]n Japan, economic enterprises are assumed to exist primarily for
the benefit of those who work within them or otherwise depend upon them for their livelihood, as
opposed to those who invest capital in them"). This tradition may erode if hostile takeovers become
as prevalent in Japan as in America. A recent decision by the Tokyo District Court invalidating
certain takeover defenses may signal a wider acceptance of such transactions in Japanese society.
See Kanabayashi & Brauchli, Tokyo Court Invalidates Defenses of Grocery Chains Against Raiders,
Wall St. J., July 26, 1989, at A9, col. 1. The result would be a heightened emphasis on the interests
of shareholders.
62. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 39-41; Macey, supra note 24, at 196.
63. See Davis, Discretion of Corporate Management To Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder
Gain-A Survey of and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CANADA-UNITED STATES L.J.
7, 17-19 (1988).
64. Former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman David Ruder believes that state
antitakeover statutes allowing corporate managers to consider the interests of nonshareholder con-
stituencies are misguided because they block the accountability of corporate management that is said
to follow from making shareholders paramount. See Ruder Discusses Implications of Leveraged
Buyouts, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1340, at 13-14 (May 31, 1989).
65. See, eg., R. CLARK, supra note 53, at 679 (asserting that "[a] single, objective goal like
profit maximization is more easily monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal"); Hetherington,
Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 248, 280 (1969) (arguing that the singular goal of profit maximization provides a recognizable
standard for evaluating managerial performance).
66. The notion of "shareholder welfare" is itself quite vague. Even if we focus on share prices
as the sharpest indicator, we can never know which course of action in a full matrix of possible
actions will maximize a company's share price. Adolf Berle acknowledged that the notion of share-
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formance of senior management might be measured against the
requirement that they hire only persons whose last names begin with the
letter N. Because this standard is much sharper than the fuzzy notion of
shareholder welfare, it would be easier to implement. In short, the belief
that corporate managers should be held accountable does not logically
lead to the conclusion that maximizing shareholder wealth is the proper
focal point of corporate activity. That claim requires additional support.
The second response is more fundamental. No one disputes that
corporate law's abiding concern with accountability is perfectly under-
standable and proper. Vigilance in policing the exercise of power enjoys
a venerable heritage in many cultures.67 In our own democratic polity,
attentiveness to the use and abuse of power dates back to the early repub-
licans and runs unwaveringly through the Jacksonians and the populists,
and on into the modern era.68 The notion that those with power can and
must be held accountable, then, is a social norm that is not indigenous or
unique to corporate law but one that transcends and predates it. It is a
concept with widespread appeal because it resonates so deeply with the
democratic sensibility.
Once resort is made to a social norm originating outside corporate
law as a justification for circumscribing the domain of corporate concern,
however, one quickly encounters a vast array of social norms. Many of
these are more or less consistent with each other, but others are some-
what at odds. The conflict becomes particularly evident when one de-
scends from the plane of generality and confronts a specific issue. For
example, in our society the concepts of patriotism and free speech seem
compatible, even inseparable, in most cases. But is it patriotic to uphold
holder primacy does not ineluctably lead to specific corporate actions. See Berle, For Whom Corpo-
rate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1369-72 (1932); see also Dallas, Two
Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 19, 104-05 (1988)
(listing reasons why the profit objective is vague and not easily monitored).
67. M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 1-20 (1967) (discussing
how the United States, France, and England have responded to the need for checks on governmental
power).
68. James Madison voiced the importance of controlling those entrusted with political power:
"It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other govern-
ments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents .... THE
FEDERALIST No. 62, at 376, 379 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Madison also warned:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who
possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the soci-
ety; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous
whilst they continue to hold their public trust.
THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350, 350 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
For a description of the populist distrust of power, see L. GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT
37-40 (1978). A description of modern concentration of political power is found in C. MILLS, THE
POWER ELITE 298-324 (1956).
882
Vol. 68:865, 1990
Corporate Life and Corporate Law
the right of free speech as expressed in the act of burning the American
flag in political protest?69 Many believe that the two notions are per-
fectly congruent, but a considerable segment, including President Bush 70
and four Justices of the Supreme Court,71 disagrees. Whether their rea-
soning is or is not sound, many see a clash of two important values in this
instance; the result is federal legislation criminalizing flag desecration.
72
Similarly, the assertion that the interests of capital providers should
trump all others in corporate affairs is at once consistent with and repug-
nant to our cultural traditions. Shareholders often are likened to an ex-
asperated political citizenry striving to be heard by its elected
representatives (the board of directors) or to mistreated property owners
seeking to do as they wish with their individual property (shares of com-
mon stock). So viewed, their concerns hold considerable appeal in the
limited context of their bilateral relationship to managers. On the other
hand, many believe that existing patterns of corporate stock ownership
continue to favor a certain privileged group in society.73 Viewed in this
way, considerable resistance will meet the claim that one select group
should predominate over others in a context that implicates interests
more sweeping than the shareholder-manager relationship. In this situa-
tion, as with other issues, our culture simultaneously displays a curious
solicitude and resentment toward the trappings of wealth.
Again, the question is not whether one position is more sound than
the other. At this level of core belief, much more is involved than dispas-
sionate analysis and the desire to avoid inconsistency in abstract outlook.
69. The Supreme Court recently held that burning the American flag as an overt act of political
expression was protected by the first amendment. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989).
70. See Cole, Flagging Issue for Mr. Bush, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 13.
71. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, White, Stevens, JJ., dissenting);
id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (103 Stat.) 777. Another highly charged clash is apparent in the ongoing controversy over
Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses. To many in the Western world, however insensitive certain
passages of that book might be, the right to express even offensive ideas is highly valued afd zeal-
ously guarded. See H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION 6-19 (1988) (describing how the American
free speech tradition protects individuals from blasphemy and censorship laws). Many Muslims,
however, reject the belief that one is free to blaspheme Allah. See Nariman, Freedom of Speech and
Blasphemy, INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS REV., June 1989, at 53, 53-56 (discussing the relation-
ship between the speech and religion clauses of India's constitution). To them, the controversy in
the West makes little sense because they value reverence for Allah more highly than freedom of
expression. The clash is not simply over Rushdie's behavior; it is over the normative framework by
which that behavior is to be evaluated and sanctioned.
73. See J. BURK, VA.LUES IN THE MARKETPLACE 164 (1988) (showing in a table that in 1976
the top 1% of adult American wealth holders owned 46% of corporate stock held in the personal
sector); M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 52-53 (1976) (citing several studies
of shareholding concentration). The recent rise of ESOPs, see Farrell & Hoer, ESOPs: Are They
Good for You?, BUs. WK., May 15, 1989, at 116, 116, and the prevalence of other pension plans are
unlikely to alter the perception of a skewed pattern of stock ownership.
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The influence of perception, emotion, the sense of fair play, and other
traditional-and potentially conflicting-values in shaping the law can-
not be underestimated. Nor can context be ignored. Many are quite
willing to favor shareholders over managers in the garden-variety two-
party issues on which traditional corporate-law doctrine was forged. Yet
they might balk at an absolute and unswerving preference for sharehold-
ers over the broad spectrum of nonmanagement interests thought to be
implicated in the disrupting world of hostile takeovers. When the gener-
ally accepted norm of shareholder welfare yields to accommodate other
considerations, we see that the strength and reach of a particular legal
norm can be driven into a state of flux. Shareholder primacy, like many
other values, is "defeasible" 74-embraced, but not blindly or categori-
cally. Otherwise, if such notions were brittle rather than pliant and com-
modious, they would snap when subjected to the ongoing stresses of
social change.
2. Efficiency.-Lest the takeover debate take on the polarizing
overtones of pitting the privileged against the unprivileged, which our
democratic egalitarian tradition so disdains, and in an effort to extend
the shareholder-primacy norm thoroughly into the takeover setting,
those who champion takeovers have fashioned an ingenious rejoinder to
the previous objection. They assert that any divergence of shareholder
and other important interests on the takeover issue is more apparent than
real, more temporary than permanent.75 Ironically, this assertion hinges
on a tenet drawn from the esoteric field of financial economics-the hy-
74. For a discussion of defeasibility in Herbert Hart's theory of law, see M. MARTIN, THE
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF H.L.A. HART: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 116-18 (1987).
75. Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter examine various theories that takeovers redistribute wealth to
target-company shareholders from various other parties rather than channelling assets to more pro-
ductive uses. They conclude that:
The literature, while not conclusive, offers little or no support for the notion that the redis-
tribution theories explain a major portion of the apparent gains from takeovers. It has
been impossible so far to find systematic losses which could offset the enormous gains to
... shareholders from mergers, tender offers, and other corporate-control activities. We
therefore conclude that evidence is consistent with the notion that these corporate transac-
tions reflect economically beneficial reshuffling of productive assets.
Jarrell, supra note 19, at 58; see also Ribstein, supra note 24, at 141 (asserting that "Itihere is mount-
ing evidence that takeovers result in substantial net gains for society as a whole, and that substantial
gains by target shareholders do not come at the expense of other groups"). In spite of these optimis-
tic statements about the efficiency consequences of takeovers, economists are far from agreement on
that point. See Scherer, Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments, 2 J. EcON. PEaSP. 69, 80
(1988); supra note 20. For arguments that takeovers do enable shareholders to appropriate gains
from other groups, see Coffee, supra note 8, at 48-51 and Shleifer & Summers, Breach of Trust in
Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, supra note 11, at 33, 42. For the views of a takeover
proponent who acknowledges that shareholders can appropriate wealth through opportunistic be-
havior, see Macey, supra note 24, at 176.
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pothesis of efficient capital markets.76 Rather than developing that no-
tion or elaborating the argument for unfettered takeover activity
predicated on it, this subsection only describes the upshot of the resulting
conclusion.
By attributing oracle-like meaning to the behavior of the stock
prices of the target company near the time of a takeover bid,77 many
takeover proponents have sought to align shareholder well-being with an
important societal concern--efficiency in the use of economic re-
sources.78 Thus, a rule of corporate governance requiring management
to focus on shareholder well-being as measured by share prices not only
enhances shareholder wealth and solves corporate law's nettlesome ac-
countability problem but also serves as an infallible method for advanc-
ing the interests (or at least an interest) of society at large. 79
Consequently, according to this view, corporate takeovers do not intro-
duce an unwelcome divisiveness into American society as many people
wrongly believe; rather, they create a happy congruence. 80  Moreover,
76. For a useful collection of materials on the efficient capital market hypothesis, see R. HAM-
ILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE 252-95 (2d ed. 1989); R. GILSON & R. KRAAKMAN, supra note 13,
at 2-9. The Supreme Court appears to have embraced the notion of efficient capital markets and its
corollary, the fraud-on-the-market theory, in the context of claims under SEC Rule 10b-5, and yet
the Court has left the states free to reject the concept in their antitakeover legislation. Compare
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (concluding that a rebuttable presumption of reli-
ance created by the fraud-on-the-market theory was proper in lOb-5 cases because all available infor-
mation, including wrong information, is reflected in stock prices) with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86 (1987) (upholding Indiana antitakeover statute against challenges based on
the commerce and supremacy clauses). In In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litig. (Paramount Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.), [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94514 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), affrd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989), Chancellor Allen expressed misgivings about the
efficient market hypothesis and concluded that "just as the Constitution does not enshrine Mr. Her-
bert Spencer's social statics, neither does the common law of directors' duties elevate the theory of a
single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred text." Id. 94514, at 93277. For a discus-
sion of the Paramount decision, see infra notes 256-91 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Lehn & Mitchell, Agency Evaluates Bust-Up Takeover, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 6, 1989, at
S1, col. 1, S3, col. 2 (optimistically stating that "[t]he stock market seems to provide a good estimate,
almost instantaneously, of the likelihood that acquisitions will 'succeed' (if retaining acquired assets
is a measure of success)"). This mode of discourse-that the market is a "force of nature, governed
by laws all its own" and that it is "out there"-is easy to fall into, but it can distract us from the fact
that at any given time market prices are simply the result of a consensus of the people buying and
selling. Rowe, Individuals Control the Market, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 1, 1989, at 13, col. 2.
The predictive powers of a large group of persons are not necessarily superior to those of a small
group.
78. See Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 23, at 1866-67 & n.19, 1892-93 & n.125.
79. See id.
80. Sprinkel, The Real Issue in Corporate Takeovers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1987, at 16, col. 3 ("In
the process of maximizing the wealth of America's shareholders, we create benefits for the economy
as a whole."). Robert Reich has noted in another context that this congruence expresses "principles
already codified in American law and policy: The corporation existed for its shareholders, and as
they prospered, so would the nation." Reich, Corporation and Nation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May




this argument vindicates corporate law's traditional preoccupation with
the shareholder-management relationship from the charge of intellectual
parochialism because its insights ultimately lead to outcomes that work
for the general good of nonshareholder groups as well.
This mode of reasoning exhibits two notable qualities. First, it is
somewhat paradoxical. In an attempt to constrain management and
achieve accountability, corporate law prohibits management from con-
sciously and overtly serving nonshareholder interests; this
proshareholder focus nonetheless winds up serving a whole host of non-
shareholder interests. Act narrowly; serve globally. 81 Second, the rea-
soning apparently concedes that the linkage between shareholder welfare
and societal well-being is critical.82 Without it, the concerns of corporate
law are not visibly moored to more generally shared expectations of cor-
porate behavior. In a recognized conflict, those concerns might be forced
to yield to more important considerations-just as, however important
free speech might usually be, many believe it must succumb to respect for
the flag. Many takeover critics might concede that the quest for account-
ability can be achieved by carrying corporate law's narrow compass into
the takeover arena, yet reject this application because accountability is
purchased at a price they believe too dear. To short-circuit precisely that
reaction, the claim for efficiency is a powerful and, in the eyes of many, a
clinching protakeover argument.
Ultimately, the extent to which high levels of takeover activity re-
dound to the general good is the key policy issue associated with the
takeover phenomenon. It is an empirical question, and, as indicated by
congressional immobility on the subject, it is still very much in doubt.
Even if authoritative evidence linking high levels of takeover activity
with efficiency in the use of economic resources eventually appears, state
lawmakers probably would not defer to that evidence. Society at large
does not vote in state elections. State legislators, therefore, will readily
sacrifice efficiency gains for the nation as a whole to forestall the jarring
81. In exploring the relationship between the strategies of corporations and the goals of the
nation, Reich describes the views of those who believe that corporate allegiance to shareholders
remains paramount: "The world economy as a whole will be stronger if corporations are free to
attract investors from anywhere and undertake production anywhere, with the sole objective of re-
warding their shareholders with the highest possible returns." Id. at 80. Apparently, what is good
for shareholders is not only good for the nation, but for the world.
82. As Professors Meyer and Gustafson note, the linkage between individual welfare and the
public good forms part of "the oldest moral traditions of the West, which held that persons should
pursue not only proper self-fulfillment but also the common good and that these two ends were
mutually implicated." Meyer & Gustafson, Epilogue: For Whom Does the Corporation Toil?, in THE
U.S. BUSINESS CORPORATION, supra note 11, at 211, 230.
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dislocation of voting members of their local constituencies. 83 Such polit-
ical decision making is an unalterable fact of life in our federalist system.
If, however, the efficiency argument can carry the political day at the
national level, there would at least be a sounder basis for congressional
action, perhaps through express preemption of the area. But such action
now is both empirically premature and politically unattainable. 84 In the
meantime, as we weather this state of incomplete knowledge, takeovers
go on. No voluntary cease-fire has been called while public policy gets
thrashed out. Given the legislative public-law vacuum, 85 the takeover
dilemma falls squarely into the laps of the Delaware judiciary. Unlike
legislators, judges cannot evade the knotty questions associated with so-
cial transformation by pleading for more time and further information.
Lacking omniscience and drawing on whatever is at hand, judges re-
spond on an acute rather than a systemic basis, deciding specific cases for
litigants while resolving bedrock issues for society at large.
Whether the takeover issue is addressed wholesale by legislators as a
public-policy subject or piecemeal by judges as a corporate-law question,
support for the focus on shareholders must ultimately be found outside
the walls of corporate law. The support must be rooted in exogenous and
broad-based social norms. As Delaware's judges decide today's momen-
tous takeover issues, it matters not that they couch their actions in the
cramped conceptual and linguistic conventions of corporate law. Neces-
sarily and properly, they are free to probe behind the simplistic assertion
that shareholder welfare is paramount and decisive at all times and in all
circumstances. Being more than private referees, judges can and must be
83. Professor Romano described this point as "intejurisdictional subsidization." Romano,
supra note 27, at 138-41.
84. "'There are lots of people who would like to pre-empt the state [takeover] statutes, but the
majority of them are law professors and economists.... That's not a large enough constituency to
encourage strong federal pressure to overturn what are about 40 state laws.'" Sontag, After Ruling,
Stricter Laws on Mergers?, Nat'l L.J., July 10, 1989, at 24, col. 4 (quoting Professor John Coffee of
Columbia University School of Law). In 1988, Congress considered preemption, but intense lobby-
ing by labor unions, the Business Roundtable, and other groups quashed the subject. See id.
85. In using "legislative vacuum," I do not mean to deny that many state legislatures have
passed antitakeover statutes. See, eg., IND. CODE § 23-1-42 (1989) (permitting disinterested share-
holders to decide whether voting power will be given to the acquirer's "control shares"); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990) ("no... corporation shall engage in any business
combination with any interested shareholder... for a period of five years following such interested
shareholder's stock acquisition date unless ... approved by the board of directors"); OHio REv.
CODE ANN. § 1701.01 (Anderson 1985) ("any control share acquisition of an issuing public corpora-
tion shall be made only with the prior authorization of the shareholders of such corporation").
Instead, I use the phrase because Congress has failed to act and because Delaware's statute, the most
important, is not particularly burdensome. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988) ("a
corporation shall not engage in any business combination with any interested stockholder for a pe-
riod of three years" unless one of seven exceptions apply).
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willing to reexamine the social footings of that position.86 Yet, if such
reexamination is legitimate at all, as the takeover enthusiasts themselves
suggest by resorting to accountability and efficiency as justifications for
shareholder primacy, then judges are manumitted to consider other so-
cial norms as well8 7 and to determine how they bear on the takeover
issue.88
86. Professor Macey has noted that although courts increasingly approve of board conduct that
takes account of nonshareholder interests, they "have failed to articulate a theoretical basis" for
doing so. Macey, supra note 24, at 178. He rejects efforts to ground protection of nonshareholders
in property and tort law, and, consistent with his view that corporations are networks of contractual
relationships, he concludes that private contracting can protect nonshareholders even better than
regulatory intervention. See id. at 200-01. Macey fails to consider that the law "protects" nonshare-
holders not by conferring affirmative legal entitlements on them (whether under the auspices of
property law, contract law, or statute), but by limiting the ability of another party (shareholders) to
alienate stock without limitation. Antitakeover statutes and judge-made doctrine, both of which
accord management significant say in the conduct of hostile-takeover bids, serve to protect various
nonshareholders by effectively impairing shareholder autonomy over the decision to sell stock and
thereby transfer control of corporate assets. Thus, corporate law serves nonshareholder interests in
much the same "indirect" way as restraints on alienation of property and the nonenforceability of
contracts on public-policy grounds serve interests other than the property owner or promisee. See
Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 931, 937-51
(1985) (discussing theoretical rationales for restrictions on alienability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981) ("A premise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy if ... the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circum-
stances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.").
87. Herbert Hart explicitly recognized this point in his later writing on legal reasoning. In
describing cases that could not clearly be brought under an existing rule, he explained that judicial
decisions:
[D]o not arise in a vacuum but in the course of the operation of a working body of rules, an
operation in which a multiplicity of diverse considerations are continuously recognized as
good reasons for a decision. These include a wide variety of individual and social interests,
social and political aims, and standards of morality and justice .... Frequently these
considerations conflict, and courts are forced to balance or weigh them and to determine
priorities among them.
Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 264, 271 (P. Ed-
wards ed. 1967), reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 88, 107
(1983); see also Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 986 (1977) (describing the "convictions of many lawyers that it is
indeed perfectly proper and indeed at times necessary for judges to take account of the impact of
their decisions on the general community welfare").
88. Professors Gilson and Kraakman contend that if judges were to empower management to
consider nonshareholder interests, the result would be to "render most of corporate law incoherent."
Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standardfor Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to
Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 267 n.65 (1989). That statement is wrong for at least
two reasons. First, it mistakenly lumps takeover doctrine with more traditional corporate-law
precepts. In garden-variety corporate cases addressing managerial competence or self-dealing, only
the second-order issue of corporate governance is implicated while the root question of corporate
purpose is submerged. Because they are less directly at stake, nonshareholder interests add little to
the doctrinal analysis. Takeovers more visibly raise the foundational question of corporate purpose
because they both imbue shareholders with awesome power and abruptly unsettle a whole cluster of
corporate relationships. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the statement suffers from a misunder-
standing of the term "coherence." As Professor Eisenberg has observed, the term has a dual aspect.
See M. EISENBERG, supra note 47, at 44-46. It includes "systemic consistency," which, apparently,
is what Professors Gilson and Kraakman mean by the term as applied to corporate law as an intel-
lectual system. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra, at 260. Yet it also denotes "social congruence," a
resonance with deep-seated social norms. By ignoring this dimension, Gilson and Kraakman pro-
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C. Constraints on Decision-Maker Discretion
At this point, two related objections might be made to my line of
argument. One is general and the other is specific.
L Avoiding the LegalAbyss: The Refuge ofFormalism.-At a gen-
eral level, some corporate scholars will draw on formalist legal theory to
contend that it is wholly illicit for judges to consider social norms 89 and
that the judicial function is and must be considerably more circum-
scribed. They may argue that the introduction of such hazy matters as
social norms simply shifts the risk of uncontrollable discretion from cor-
porate management to judges. Judges would have free rein to canvass
the social landscape, and their accountability and the entire legitimacy of
the adjudicative function in a free society would be at stake.90 This im-
portant point, by highlighting the danger of according judges the discre-
tion to remake the very rules by which they are said to be bound,
ceed as though corporate law were somehow quarantined from those considerations. Eisenberg's
richer rendition of coherence is more consistent with the Latin word cohaereo, meaning to "stick
together" and to "be joined (by ties of relationship, friendship, etc.)." OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY
347 (1969). Furthermore, to insist on "coherence" is, as with the references to accountability and
efficiency, to invoke a norm from outside corporate law to justify the focus of corporate law. It is
perfectly appropriate to do so provided it is recognized that coherence and efficiency and accounta-
bility must compete with other norms.
89. I am not suggesting that scholars overtly borrow from formalist legal theory; rather, the
arguments made are often formalistic in nature. A prime example is Professor Ribstein's continued
reference to "the corporate contract" as if the contours of that notion were quite evident and its
power to resolve legal disputes talismanic. See Ribstein, supra note 24, at 141-42, 150. One of the
larger aims of this Article is to highlight the formalistic tone of discourse so that discussion within
corporate law may become more self-conscious and more explicitly informed by larger (and impor-
tant) debates in legal theory. The chief way in which corporate law has looked outside itself in the
past decade is to use economic analysis and the language of contract law. Insights abound in those
fields, but to speak as if invoking certain precepts from these areas will bring closure to the problems
of corporate law (or law in general) is to become more, not less, rigid.
90. This is the primary concern of Robert Bork in the field of constitutional law where he
argues that judges must resist the temptation to substitute their vision of the public good for that of
the legislative branch or the framers of the Constitution. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 143-60 (1989). For the very different views of a commentator whose conservative creden-
tials are also impeccable, see R. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of
Public Choice Theory 39 (Sept. 18, 1989) (paper delivered at Washington & Lee University School
of Law) (copy on file with Texas Law Review) (arguing that independence of judges necessarily
makes them somewhat unaccountable). However important the debate over judicial interpretation,
it is one thing to argue about how judges should interpret texts written by others and another to
argue about what judges should do in the absence of texts. In common law, of course, although
there is precedent, there is no text (L a, constitution, statute, or rule) to interpret; thus the problem of
judicial discretion may be even worse. Indeed, Professor Schauer remarks that Professor Eisenberg,
in attempting to describe what judges do in this area, follows a path that is "especially treacherous."
Schauer, Book Review, supra note 47, at 467. One appeal of the contractual theory of corporate law
is that it purports to describe a bargain and, hence, it again reduces the judicial function to interpret-
ing a bargain-a kind of text-struck by other parties. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
Thus, the contractual theory of the corporation has profound implications for how judicial power
seemingly is constrained in the corporate sphere.
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expresses the puzzling nature of the common-law method generally.91
Corporate law, however, cannot pretend to elude the full import of this
larger theoretical quandary by clutching the security blanket of a
shrunken two-party world. Instead, we must directly examine the way in
which the preconceptions, methodology, and the very structure of corpo-
rate law-for which judge-made law plays an integral role-fit into over-
arching concerns about judicial law making. The task for scholarship is
to transcend the doctrinal cubbyholes of corporate law and explore (or at
least be as sensitive to) similarities in judicial law making across legal
fields. 92 Once we have made that move into the realm of legal theory, the
challenge will be to steer between the formalist claim and the realist
claim. On the one hand, the formalist argues that judge-made doctrine
occupies a discrete normative universe both smaller than and largely im-
mune from incessant encroachment by the totality of social propositions.
The realist, on the other hand, insists that "social propositions are the
masters in every case."
'93
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explain or defend in general
the common-law method and the interaction of what Professor Melvin
Eisenberg has called "social propositions" and "doctrinal proposi-
tions."94 Rather, the Article addresses one conspicuous instance of the
interplay between legal doctrine and social norms in an effort to demon-
strate how the claims of formalism and realism might be reconciled. It
contends that corporate law is not the stronghold of unalloyed formalism
it is sometimes thought to be and that support for its traditionally narrow
focus on shareholder primacy is inescapably grounded in larger social
norms. Furthermore, those possibly conflicting and ever-evolving social
norms vitally influence the adjudication of takeover contests even though
Delaware's judges look to, and speak in terms of, the twin doctrinal
91. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 47, at 43-49.
92. Dean Robert Clark's recent article on the advantages and disadvantages of various sources
of rules--contractual, elitist, and traditional-while not focusing exclusively on judicial lawmaking,
is a valuable effort to place corporate law, indeed legal and normative systems generally, into a broad
perspective. See Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1703-47 (1989). Professor Kronman criticizes Dean Clark for failing to
explain why he chooses td assess the pros and cons of the various sources from the standpoint of
welfare maximization. See Clark, supra, at 1713 n.30; Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1748, 1755-56 (1989). It would be interesting for Clark to analyze situations in
which sources of law supply disparate normative frameworks. For example, given that the main
concern of people making contracts might be understood to be welfare maximization, their behavior
might rightly be evaluated in those terms. But tradition in any but the most stagnant society might
bequeath a more complex set of values on which to base an evaluation of this behavior. From what
vantage point or by what decisional rule does one, even in theory, determine which source of law
should govern? Although Clark ends up favoring tradition, he seems to reach this conclusion on
some basis other than his original basis of welfare maximization. See Clark, supra, at 1744-47.
93. Schauer, Book Review, supra note 47, at 466.
94. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 47, at 1.
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strands of corporate law-management discretion and shareholder pri-
macy. This Article contends that doctrinal propositions are socially
loaded vessels that are occasionally reloaded to better fulfill their func-
tion as the clumsy but vital vernacular in which widely subscribed no-
tions about the proper meaning of corporate activity are expressed.
Moreover, because courts are not the fount of their own authority to
make law, and inasmuch as they owe a duty that radiates beyond the
immediate litigants to society at large, the adjudicative function would
face a legitimacy crisis if judges did not mediate social norms and legal
doctrine, not because they do.
2. Misunderstanding Corporateness.-At a more local but related
level, and in a further attempt to delimit both managerial and judicial
discretion, some assert that the nature of corporate relationships has
been badly misconceived. Rather than liken shareholders to citizens in
an economic polity or to owners of property or even to beneficiaries
under trust law, many corporate scholars draw on the work of financial
economists to describe corporate relationships in the language of con-
tract law.95 The corporate firm as a reified entity is dismantled into a
network of two-party contractual relationships. A business firm is sim-
ply the nexus where economic actors pursue the beneficial, bargained-for
95. For the economics literature, see Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794 (1972) (asserting that the contractual struc-
ture of the firm arises as a means of enhancing efficient organization of team production); Cheung,
The Contractual Nature ofthe Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-21 (1983) (interpreting Coase's arguments
about the scope of economic behavior in the light of the findings about contracts in general and
about the piece-rate contract in particular and arguing that the word "firm" is a shorthand descrip-
tion of a way to organize activities under contractual arrangements); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 307-08
(1976) (discussing the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in contracts between
the owners and managers of a firm); Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982) (suggesting that the most useful way to analyze the
modem enterprise is to interpret the terms of the economic arrangements of a firm as a series of
bargains subject to constraints and made in contemplation of a long-term relationship); Williamson,
Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1200 (1984) (using a microanalytic approach in transac-
tion-cost economics to examine contracts of corporate constituencies). The origins of the contrac-
tual approach go back to Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937), but only
began to influence corporate-law theory in any significant way in the 1980s. For legal scholarship
drawing on this economics literature, see Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law:
The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1840-46 (1989) (con-
cluding that labor, control, capital, and product markets will discourage managers from bringing
value-decreasing amendments with respect to "insignificantly redistributive issues"); Butler, The
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, GEO. MASON L. REv., Summer 1989, at 99, 99 (providing an
extensive explanation of contractual theory of the corporation); Ribstein, supra, note 24, at 75-94
(developing the theory that takeover defenses are terms of the shareholders' contract); Bebchuk,
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law-Foreward: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corpo-
rate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989); see also Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes
and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 611, 615-17 (1988) (summarizing the contractual the-
ory of the corporation).
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exchange of productive inputs.96 The chief axis still runs from share-
holders to management, however, and shareholders alone are entitled to
the unwavering devotion of managers because shareholders are residual
claimants who get "paid" after everyone else's fixed claims are satis-
fied.97 To make the contractual model work, tQese scholars analogize
shareholders to principals and corporate managers to agents-not agents
of the corporation but the direct agents of shareholders. To support this
metaphor, its proponents attempt to recast corporate law. Corporate
statutes are regarded as "standard form contracts"98 made available to
contracting parties to minimize the bargaining costs of assembling such a
complex transaction. The parties remain free, however, to opt out of or
contract around these normal provisions. 99 Similarly, judicial doctrine
dealing with the shareholder-management relationship is lifted out of the
historically rich, context-bound domain of fiduciary obligation and is
spuriously reduced to an effort to fathom "a standby or off-the-rack
guess about what parties would agree to if they [had] dickered about the
subject explicitly."' °
Recent commentators have criticized this metaphor and have seri-
ously questioned its analytical utility. 10 1 Two aspects of the contractual
model warrant mention here. First, shareholder welfare remains central
in the model because shareholder contractual rights are chiefly and most
riskily at stake.10 2 Furthermore, the singular focus on shareholder wel-
fare severely curtails both managerial and judicial discretion. Manage-
ment's charge is simply to fulfill "the implicit terms of their employment
agreements with shareholders."10 3 Judges are not free to roam the social
landscape, but are to confine themselves to figuring out what the bargain
is and then enforcing it or penalizing its breach. 4 Corporate law is re-
96. For both a further description and a critique of this conception, see Bratton, The "Nexus of
Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 410-12 (1989).
97. See Macey, supra note 24, at 186.
98. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 95, at 617. Corporate statutes are sometimes described as
establishing default rules to indicate that they apply in the absence of explicit choice. See Clark,
supra note 92, at 1706 & n.ll.
99. See Bebchuk, supra note 95, at 1820-25, 1859-60 (describing and criticizing position of
unlimited right to opt out of corporate-law rules).
100. Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S.
901 (1988); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702
(1982) (discussing the advantages of the fiduciary principle and arguing that it approximates the
terms to which two parties would agree in a true contractual negotiation).
101. See Bratton, supra note 96, at 410; Dallas, supra note 66; DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 889 & n.45.
102. See Macey, supra note 24, at 180.
103. Id. at 186.
104. Professor Ribstein states that the "law's role should be to interpret and enforce the con-
tracts the parties have made and to provide generally waivable standard terms to reduce the costs of
entering into customized agreements." Ribstein, supra note 24, at 78.
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garded as private ordering par excellence, and any sense of corporate law
as public law is completely absent. In this way the model allegedly
achieves its own esteemed virtue-commercial and juridical accountabil-
ity. In reality, the power to supply a guess about what other people
would agree to is an awesome power indeed, as is the even more basic
power to decide whether particular formulations of the scope of the judi-
cial task will be embraced or rejected.105 Thus, the presence of a public
law giver is inescapable, and judicial discretion is not so much limited as
it is disguised.
The contractual model also supposedly fulfills the norms of judicial
modesty, 10 6 determinacy, 10 7 and economic self-reliance. Persons are eco-
nomic actors who, as contracting parties, are exhorted to protect them-
selves by shrewd bargaining, not by expecting managers or judges to look
after them. The contractual model thus presents a self-regulating system
in which informed private ordering minimizes the need for public over-
sight. 108 Firms are a convenient meeting place for wary actors to negoti-
105. Professor Ribstein chides critics of this conception of "hypothetical bargain" for not under-
standing that this approach "is simply a way of arriving at a result when the parties have not bar-
gained. The substituted-market result is justified not because it is the product of bargaining, but
rather because it minimizes transaction costs." Ribstein, supra note 24, at 108 n.193. Ribstein's
remarks confess the metaphorical (and nonconsensual) nature of the corporate contract, and they
reveal an overtly normative objective for corporate law-to reduce transaction costs. The footings of
that normative position cannot, however, be the bargain of the parties themselves because, conced-
edly, the parties have not bargained over everything (including whether transaction costs should
always and above all else be lowered and whether the corporate statute will enable them to waive the
statutory provisions). Unavoidably, because the parties have not decided all the issues that might
arise-indeed, have not been given the right to decide all issues-the contractual model does little to
relieve the burden of the judicial "guess." Thus, this position is not grounded on consent at all, but
on its proponents' desire to have judges make law in a particular way.
106. Professor Schauer has generally described the appeal of this virtue. See Schauer, Formal-
ism, supra note 47, at 543; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text (examining the question of
when straying from judicial modesty destroys legitimacy).
107. Many corporate-law scholars have followed Judge Richard Posner's lead in drawing on
economic analysis to rescue law from what Posner has called the "horror of indeterminacy." Pos-
ner, Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline?, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 333, 340
(1987). Economics thus nourishes a kind of respectable legal formalism. In political philosophy,
Professor Gordon Wood similarly attributes the appeal of Leo Strauss's thought to its "heroic schol-
arly defiance of modernity with all its dreadful relativism, skepticism, and nihilism. Strauss offered
... a rational, scholarly, intellectually respectable.., refuge against the confusion and erosion of
values in our modem world." G. WooD, THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 3-4
(1988).
108. Professor Tribe describes the tendency to view the realm of private action as natural and
prior to public intervention as a
psychological and ideological predilection to perceive the existence of a private sphere-
albeit circumscribed by law and by the state-in which actions are autonomous: "Many of
us... cling to such institutions as freedom of contract and private property, viewing them
as a natural 'given' part of the legal landscape which provides a background for our pri-
vate, consensual transactions."
Tribe, supra note 18, at 10 n.40 (quoting L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICEs 264 (1985)); see also
id. at 23-24 n.90 (describing the way in which neoclassical economics makes assumptions about the
background against which law operates).
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ate to their own advantage. Enduring relationships are not valued in
their own right, but will be attended to out of enlightened self-interest
and dropped just as fast when better opportunities arise. The web of
advantage must not become a snare of privation. Furthermore, this rest-
less dynamic allows rapid redeployment of assets, and thereby the social
good of ever greater efficiency in the use of resources can be achieved.
This vision of commercial activity, stark and mechanistic as it is,
may well be a largely accurate description of human affairs. It might
even be proffered with a twinge of regret. 0 9 Certainly, the belief that the
world really works this way will shape one's understanding of law. The
vision relies on certain base unchanging principles of human behavior
drawn from economics," 0 which, as a social science, is naively believed
to be immune from deeper critiques of law. The law's function, then, is
fatalistically to accept and conform to perceived reality.''
Obvious problems with the contractual model are that, as an onto-
logical matter, the world of social action might not work quite the way it
is thought, and that, as an epistemological matter, relying on the insights
of economics alone may preclude us from completely knowing whether it
does. Moreover, the model ignores the way in which the very practice of
contracting in markets is grounded on noncontractual social and legal
values. ' 2 Finally, the stoic way in which this viewpoint chooses to re-
109. In commenting on Francis Fukuyama's provocative essay, Michael Novak describes what
he regards as
the single most persistent criticism of democratic capitalism, even among its friends: that it
is spiritually deficient. It may work, they say. It may produce abundance. It may put an
end to famine, curb disease, enable the average age of mortality to jump from eighteen in
the year 1800 to seventy-five in 1986. It may even generate unprecedented liberties. But,
they say, all this is for naught, since under democratic capitalism human beings live vacu-
ous and empty lives.
Novak, Boredom, Virtue, and Democratic Capitalism, 88 COMMENTARY 34, 34 (1989) (commenting
on Fukuyama, The End of History?, THE NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3). Novak goes on to
criticize this harsh judgment as grounded on the mistaken notion that democratic capitalism is in-
tended to "fill the soul" or "teach a philosophy," rather than simply "create space within which the
soul may make its own choices." Id. Novak is correct that market economies are not designed to
provide spiritual fulfillment so much as liberation from certain oppressions. Regrettably, however,
such economies tend to promote an outlook on life that is egocentric and oriented toward the satis-
faction of ever-increasing material appetites without reference to how individual choices bear on
others. Thus, the principles by which economic activity is organized become, however unintended,
the underlying premises by which the moral order of a society is organized. See A. WOLFE, WHOSE
KEEPER?: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION 17-18 (1989).
110. As Professor Bratton points out, the contractual notion of the corporation "succeeded in
bringing the interior of the firm to neoclassical economics and in bringing neoclassical economics
inside the firm." Bratton, supra note 96, at 416.
111. To view the law as simply the vehicle by which the insights of social sciences can be brought
to bear on human affairs is, of course, to ignore the way in which legal actions themselves alter the
very social reality of which social sciences give an account. See Tribe, supra note 18, at 7-8.
112. From the vantage point of sociology, markets are social institutions:
When we say that markets are social institutions, what we mean, in part, is that they, like
all social institutions, are constituted by a moral order. The term "moral order".., refers
894
Corporate Life and Corporate Law
spond to its own existential analytic is laden with normative preference.
It espouses crafty resignation and wariness over other equally available
stances toward economic acquaintances, such as "foolish" sacrifice, com-
mitment, and the preservation of trust. It also fails to acknowledge the
richness of human motivation 13 and the deeper affection felt for those
who are closer rather than more distant in the economic sphere. 1 4 The
result is to ignore the important tasks of explaining why people should
(or should not) consider the effects of their actions on others and of ana-
lyzing the respective roles of markets and state intervention (whether leg-
islative or judicial) for inducing that behavior.1 I 5
Thus, while the notions of accountability and efficiency serve as this
model's apparent lifelines to more widely shared social norms, the dreary
egoistic underpinnings make it clear that those notions are only enticing
window dressing; they are not essential. The contractual model sub-
scribes to the root norm that, in a pinch, people do-therefore they
to the conditions of action which specify how people ought to behave .... The moral order
of a market, then, establishes rules about how one ought to trade, who is allowed to trade,
[and] what are acceptable terms of trad,... and it includes some kind of structural appa-
ratus charged with the duty of enforcing market rules. That all markets are constituted by
a moral order of this kind is no news to sociologists. It has been an important contention
within the discipline since Emile Durkbeim formulated his theory of the noncontractual
bases of contract.
J. BURK, supra note 73, at 7-8 (1988) (footnote omitted); see id. at 144-45.
113. The conservative scholar Richard Epstein has recognized that
theory must deal with the most powerful counterexamples of persons who do appear to
behave with disinterested benevolence to their fellow man .... Ideally (I think) we should
seek ... a theory that allows us to recognize ... some exceptions to the dictates of self-
interest. Such is in accord with our considered intuitions about self-interest, as with David
Hume's wonderful phrase, "self-interest with confin'd generosity."
R. Epstein, supra note 90, at 5-6.
It is fitting for Professor Epstein to cite Hume, for as Professor Wolfe points out, Hume and
other eighteenth-century thinkers recognized that
to the degree that capitalism encouraged pure selfishness, it ran the risk of destroying...
[its] moral potential. The new economic order being created during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries strengthened individual freedom, but it also made obvious the
degree to which people in civil society were interdependent.... [C]ivil society, by forcing
people to recognize the reality of their interdependence, made freedom possible. Freedom
was a social, not a natural, phenomenon, something that existed only through the recogni-
tion, rather than the denial, of obligations to others.
A. WOLFE, supra note 109, at 15-16.
114. Many who refer to Adam Smith's classic 1776 political economy treatise, A. SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1976), ignore the fact
that in 1759 he also wrote a book on moral philosophy in which he depicted man as essentially a
benevolent and altruistic being, not purely an egoist. See A. SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SEN-
TIMENTS 9 (D. Raphael & A. Macfie rev. ed. 1976) (6th ed. 1790). For a recent attempt to reconcile
these seemingly incompatible positions based on the extent to which people are bound to each other
by intimate ties, see Nieli, Spheres of Intimacy and the Adam Smith Problem, 47 J. HIST. IDEAS 611,
624 (1986).
115. See A. WOLFE, supra note 109, at 8-11. These tasks are of the utmost importance as the
countries of Eastern Europe seek to build economies that in all likelihood will follow a "middle way"
between pure market and command economic systems.
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should-act to save their own skin.' 16 If that is one's sense of life, why
should the ethos in work and business or corporate law be different? In-
evitably, the model shifts from description to prescription-we should be
what we are-and the normative cards are played. In this case, the hand
reminds one of B.F. Skinner's work with pigeons."1 7 No doubt, people,
like pigeons, often respond with distressing predictability to given stim-
uli. The difference is that people can choose to respond otherwise.' 18
Second, theorizing about the nature of corporations and corporate
relationships is useful, even in the abstract. By isolating certain relation-
ships for closer examination, corporate law can temporarily compart-
mentalize the social world to highlight and record portions of
commercial phenomena in more digestible form."19 Moreover, theo-
rizing often influences the way in which immediate participants in a spe-
cific legal dispute frame issues to comport with evolving social norms as
well as existing legal doctrine. Of course, conceptualizing within too nar-
row a framework has serious drawbacks. Even the best intellectual para-
digm may be plagued by proponents for whom its analytical constructs
become fetishes-who deny that its vision is partial, bound in time and
place, and always somewhat disengaged from the very reality it seeks to
describe. Just as discrete social norms jockey for ascendancy and must
periodically be reharmonized,120 so too must the seams of disparate frag-
ments of intellectual cloth occasionally be opened and rewoven, if only
provisionally and with humility, into a larger garment.
Moreover, as so often happens in our legal system, a prior question
to what (is the nature of corporateness or the purpose of corporate en-
deavor) is who decides (what is the nature of corporateness or the pur-
116. In positing that humans regularly behave selfishly, the contractual theory, like the classical
economic theory underlying capitalism, appears to be "anticommunal." As one observer has noted,
however, "capitalism is probably more anticommunal in theory than practice, for human beings
cannot be as consistently selfish and calculating as capitalist doctrine calls on them to be." Tinder,
Can We Be Good Without God?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1989, at 68, 84.
117. See B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 62-72 (1953).
118. Some might prefer to say that we act as though people can choose to respond differently,
but, for both individual behavior and legal doctrine, both phrases amount to the same thing.
119. In this way, corporate law's traditional focus on the shareholder-management relationship
is useful. The mistake is to insist that this generally useful framework is always useful and disposi-
tive, especially when more fundamental matters are under investigation. See supra note 58.
Although Professor Palmiter is wrong in asserting that courts have adopted shareholder wealth-
maximization as their sole reference point, his recent article on the duty of independence commenda-
bly acknowledges that the question of corporate purpose is an altogether different question, which he
does not take up. See Palmiter, supra note 5, at 1368 n.57; see also Yablon, supra note 56 ("The
remainder of this discussion ... will assume... that takeover regulation exists to maximize benefit
to target shareholders.") (emphasis added); cf. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 88 (asserting that
corporate law would be rendered "incoherent" were it to acknowledge the interests of
nonshareholders).
120. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
896
Vol. 68:865, 1990
Corporate Life and Corporate Law
pose of corporate endeavor).' 21 Today, the Delaware judiciary is the
who, and therefore we must come to grips with the manner in which it
thinks about corporate purpose, a practice that differs markedly from the
approach of academic system builders. As these judges rule on complex
and novel legal issues, unquestionably they seek guidance from both ex-
isting legal doctrine and more rarefied and intellectual models, struc-
tures, and metaphors. Yet the substantive insights of theory, however
compelling from within the snug cocoon of an intellectual paradigm
(here, the closed chamber of corporate law), will not remake corporate
doctrine unless they also have "substantial support in the commu-
nity."1 22 Given the interplay between social norms and legal doctrine in
the common-law process, it is not enough that a legal theorist is bright
and perspicacious, or even "right." One must also be appealingly and
overwhelmingly right.1 23 Only then do fresh theoretical insights break
through into new doctrine.
Before prevailing doctrine is reformed, there must be a substantial
failure of congruence between social norms and legal doctrine. Other-
wise, legal doctrine would be unstable, perhaps volatile, and not clearly
demarcated either from the realm of pure reason or from the universe of
all social norms. Moreover, an enormous outlay of time and expense
(with uncertain payoff) would be required if judges reexamined the ratio-
nales of doctrinal precedent in every case rather than uncritically refer-
ring to settled doctrine in all but the most novel disputes.124 With a
precondition of breakdown in the connection between norms and doc-
trine, doctrine does change, albeit sometimes unjustly and often too
slowly for those whose claims or theories are not yet accredited. Of
course, this conception of the interplay between norms and law bespeaks
a tremendous faith that, over time, consensus in a free society will con-
geal around only those ideals and practices that, in the stubborn residue
of our arational and asocial selves, we regard as timelessly decent and
just. Moreover, to admire the cautious dynamics of the common-law
process regardless of its inherent flaws may simply be to reveal one's own
root norm-a conservative preference for incremental change from time-
tested traditions. This preference, however, seems predominant, if only
by virtue of the continued and thriving functioning of our legal regime
and widespread assent to its method and force.
121. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
122. M. EISENBERG, supra note 47, at 15, 29.
123. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 47, at 546-48; Schauer, Book Review, supra note 47, at
470.
124. See Clark, supra note 92, at 1727.
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Today it is far from clear that there is substantial support for ex-
tending an unmitigated shareholder-primacy vision of corporate activity
into the takeover arena,1 25 whether that vision is grounded on the recent
contract model of corporateness or on more traditional portrayals. Thus,
although proponents of this vision value stability and predictability of
law and seek to curb decision maker discretion, to implement their vision
of corporate life is to invent social consensus where none exists. If legal
theory can either ordain such consensus or ignore its absence, what pre-
vents the managerial and judicial decision makers charged with oversee-
ing takeover transactions, once cut free of the anchor of social strictures,
from similarly disregarding other social conventions, such as the respon-
sibility to fulfill and enforce contracts? Unless grounded on a foundation
of nonmarket properties such as public trust and widespread assent to a
preexisting normative order, 126 neither private market activity nor confi-
dence in judicial pronouncements is possible. For judge-made corporate
law to ignore these qualities would be to unleash enormous discretion
over corporate affairs and law in the name of constraining them. Thank-
fully, theory, metaphor, and the advancement of knowledge do not oper-
ate in a sociological or institutional vacuum. Thus, the province of
corporate law is not as sealed off from other considerations, or as im-
mune from the exercise of judicial discretion, as is believed by many who
have circled the ideological wagons.
III. Traditional Corporate-Law Doctrine
Having discussed the way in which many seek-but fail-to delimit
the domain of corporate law to the shareholder-management relation-
ship, this Article next examines the manner in which traditional corpo-
rate-law doctrine reflects that narrow ambit of concern.
125. If state antitakeover legislation is any gauge of public sentiment, shareholder primacy in the
takeover arena is not a widely shared objective. See infra subpart IV(A). Moreover, according to
one public opinion poll conducted in the wake of the RJR Nabisco buyout, a large majority of
Americans believe that takeovers themselves are "somewhat" or "very" corrupt processes. Kaplan,
M & As: Should Congress Act?, Nat'l. L.J., Feb. 27, 1989, at 1, 28. Furthermore, as argued infra
Part III, in spite of the prevalence in legal theory of the shareholder-primacy norm, legal doctrine, in
practice, has subdued it.
126. Professor Wolfe believes that "economic self-interest is made possible only because obliga-
tions are part of a preexisting moral order." A. WOLFE, supra note 109, at 17; see also supra note
112. For an argument that takeover activity might reduce trust, see Shleifer & Summers, supra note
75, at 41-42. Whether takeovers actually have that effect is not the point. The point is that trust is
vital to market economies and is not itself created or sustained solely by contract. Furthermore, we
must be attentive to the ways in which economic activity both presupposes trust (and other virtues
such as commitment and fair dealing) and occasionally serves to erode trust.
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A. The Abasement of Shareholders
In form, corporate-law doctrine respects the limited compass of the
corporate sphere. Its rules express and strive to accommodate the twin
strands of management discretion and shareholder primacy on a wide
variety of issues. 127 Yet judge-made corporate doctrine has never re-
solved the inherent tension between these precepts in a way that accords
them equal prominence. Throughout the twentieth century, courts have
subordinated the shareholder-primacy aspect to an ever-enlarging mana-
gerial prerogative.' 28 The question of to whom, exactly, management
owes a fiduciary duty illustrates this development.
Early judicial pronouncements routinely declared that manage-
ment's fiduciary duty ran not directly or exclusively to shareholders but
to the "corporation and its shareholders."'129 In spite of the concerted
effort, past130 and present,' 3' to maintain a tight linkage between share-
holders and managers and to avoid the conceptual pitfall of reification,
the fact of the matter is that the "corporate enterprise" is distinct from
and larger than the joint efforts of capital providers and managers. After
all, Exxon's management operates Exxon's business, not the separate af-
fairs of Exxon's shareholders. The emphasis on duty to the corporation,
however, is also dangerous. It serves to mediate and blunt the direct
claim of shareholders on management's efforts, making shareholders
only indirect beneficiaries of an activity in which they already were by-
standers. Having engendered the corporate form, imbued it with person-
I
127. See generally R. CLARK, supra note 53, at 21-22, 32-34 (balancing the enormous discretion
of corporate centralized management against the duty of the manager to benefit the corporation and
its shareholders).
128. For a concise description of the rise and drawbacks of this "managerial capitalism," see
Conard, supra note 15, at 120-30. Undeniably, many theorists consider expansive managerial discre-
tion to be perfectly consistent with shareholder primacy. See supra note 57. The discretion of man-
agers to defeat hostile takeovers, however, continues to be a major stumbling block for this position.
129. See, eg., Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 167, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (1938) (asserting that
corporate directors have a fiduciary relationship with the corporation and its shareholders and that
the rules governing the conduct of trustees apply to directors), aff'd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939); see also
2 S. THOMPSON & J. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 1320, at 778
(3d ed. 1927) (commenting that "[tihe rule is thoroughly embedded in the general jurisprudence of
both America and England that the status of directors is such that they occupy a fiduciary relation
toward the corporation and its stockholders" (emphasis added)). For the effect of this formulation
of managerial duty on judicial review of management's takeover duty, see infra subpart IV(B).
130. Professor Adolf Berle drew on the law of trusts as a means of constraining managerial
discretion by likening shareholders to beneficiaries of a trust. See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers
in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049-51, 1072-74 (1931). Later, he turned to public welfare
considerations for restraints on managerial discretion. See A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROP-
ERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 102-10 (1959) (arguing that
the legitimacy of a corporate management depends on a consensus of acceptance by the public).
13 1. Those who advocate a contractual and market-oriented model of the corporation and who
describe managers as the "agents" of shareholders are the outstanding example.
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ality, and conferred the privileges of personhood upon it, 132 however, the
law could not very well ignore it as a sociolegal artifact. 133 Thus, since
the corporate form first began to emerge as a dominant business organi-
zation, the claim that shareholders are the sole recipients of managerial
devotion has been, in the discourse of corporate law, less fact than
fantasy.
The preeminence of shareholders in corporate affairs has faced other
assaults as well. First, although shareholders possess suffrage under cor-
porate statutes and may remove derelict directors, recourse to this mech-
anism often proves futile because coordinating large numbers of
shareholders into effective collective action is colossally problematic and
because management ordinarily dominates the proxy machinery.134 As a
result, most disenchanted shareholders dispose of their stock on capital
markets rather than pursue internal governance remedies of doubtful ef-
ficacy.135 Second, except in cases that implicate the duty of loyalty,
136
the infamous business-judgment rule's emphasis on the managerial-dis-
cretion strand of corporate law insulates most managerial behavior from
meaningful judicial review.137 In the past decade, great judicial defer-
ence to management's decision not to pursue, or to seek dismissal of,
corporate derivative actions has exacerbated this longstanding prob-
lem. 138 Third, throughout the twentieth century many corporations have
regularly contributed significant amounts of money to social, educa-
tional, and humanitarian organizations and, due to the previous two fac-
tors, management has largely succeeded in warding off shareholder
132. See Horowitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, in CORPORA-
TIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 13 (W. Samuels & A. Miller eds. 1987).
133. Historically, legal doctrine's assertion that managerial duty ran to the "corporation and its
stockholders" might be a pragmatic doctrinal accommodation to the raging late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century debate over the nature of corporateness. Asserting that directors owe duties
to stockholders acknowledges the corporation as an aggregation of individual actors, and emphasiz-
ing duties to'the corporation expresses that corporations are entities separate and distinct from indi-
vidual participants. Rather than seek to resolve a theoretical debate that could not be, and did not
need to be, resolved at the doctrinal level, see infra text accompanying notes 180-81, pretakeover
legal doctrine in the fiduciary area simply equivocated. In this example, instead of settling an issue,
tradition merely bracketed it in the service of resolving several shareholder-manager issues that arose
in twentieth-century corporate law. See supra note 92. As takeovers brought the question of corpo-
rate purpose to the fore, however, the dormant tension between duty to the corporation and duty to
its shareholders resurfaced. For a historical account of theories of the corporation, see Bratton, The
New Economic Theory ofthe Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1482-
501 (1989). For an argument that theories of the corporation by themselves have no determinate
thrust, see Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming).
134. See R. CLARK, supra note 53, at 390-400.
135. See Conard, supra note 15, at 144-46.
136. See Palmiter, supra note 5, at 1363-66.
137. See R. CLARK, supra note 53, at 123-25, 136-40; Palmiter, supra note 5, at 1358-62.
138. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS pt.
7 (Tentative Draft No. 9 1989).
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challenges to those donations.139
Some observers contend that these developments cannot be squared
with the fundamental postulate that the law must make shareholder wel-
fare paramount in corporate endeavor. 14 These observers stress that
large-scale corporate philanthropy is incompatible with the vision of
shareholder primacy 41 and that "shareholder democracy" is either a
mythical remnant from a bygone era or, worse, a cruel hoax. 42 Many
observers, alarmed at the extent to which unbridled managerial discre-
tion has subjugated shareholder welfare, would meliorate the sharehold-
ers' predicament within the traditional doctrinal framework.
Reinvigorating judicial review of management behavior and bolstering
other monitoring mechanisms such as independent boards and the deriv-
ative action are oft-heard proposals along this line,143 as is the call for
institutional investors to flex their new-found muscle.144 As a first step
toward reclaiming shareholder primacy, however, others would proceed
more boldly and seek to completely reorient our thinking about corpo-
rate relationships. The appearance of the contractual model of corporate
law is an example; it is a resourceful attempt to synthesize the normative
centrality of the shareholder function with the conceded reality of man-
agement's awesome discretion.
Still others have trundled out yet another device for reconciling cer-
tain adverse developments with shareholder preeminence-the elusive
notion of the "long run."' 145 In essence, particularly with corporate lar-
gesse, acts that do not immediately augment corporate profits or share-
holder wealth, but that benefit one or more nonshareholder groups in the
community, can nonetheless be justified and sustained against judicial
139. See Davis, supra note 63, at 57-75.
140. For a summary of objections to corporate voluntarism and the role of the business-judg-
ment rule in supporting managerial discretion in the expenditure of corporate funds, see id. at 13-28.
141. See id. at 13-19. The classic statement is that by economist Milton Friedman:
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much
money for their stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine....
[T]he direction in which policy is now moving, of permitting corporations to make contri-
butions for charitable purposes[,]... is a step in the direction of... undermining the basic
nature and character of our society.
M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133, 135-36 (1962).
142. See Conard, supra note 15, at 127-28.
143. See, e.g., Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1431 (1985) (proposing for managerial transactions "newer forms of incen-
tive and sanction" and "intervention by external authority ... to set limits on ... the terms within
which the parties can 'bargain' for their private ordering"); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 696-705 (1974) (calling for a uniform federal act
applying to all corporations engaged in interstate commerce that would help stop the "race to the
bottom" in state courts).
144. See Conard, supra note 15, at 131-44.
145. See Davis, supra note 63, at 26 n.66.
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scrutiny because they enhance the corporation's long-run interests. 146
This notion thus permits management to take explicit account of non-
shareholder interests so that the enterprise, and hence shareholders, are
better off over the longer term. This rationalization is a wonderful trib-
ute to the fluidity of corporate doctrine; it is the complete reverse of the
orthodoxy that emphasizes how, by focusing solely on shareholder wel-
fare, the larger social good is attained. 147 Whether a particular manage-
ment action actually achieves a salutary effect is a question that cannot
be answered; thus, it is never posed. 148 Instead, the chief attraction of
the long-run phantom is its marvelous ability to apparently harmonize
management discretion with shareholder primacy while, in fact, sweep-
ing the whole thing under the rug.
Whatever the form of response to unfavorable developments for
modem shareholders, two observations remain clear. First, most at-
tempts to explain, defend, or rectify the situation are premised on a
shareholder-oriented conception of the corporation. Thus, the structural
presuppositions and normative thrust of corporate law are honored. As
such, the proper treatment of shareholders is still conceived of as a gov-
ernance issue, not an issue going to the very purpose of corporate activ-
ity. So framed, corporate hegemony, not direction, endures as the
thematic focus of corporate law, and shareholders and managers perse-
vere as the only respectable contestants for the center of the stage. Sec-
ond, notwithstanding continued lip service to the orthodox notion of
shareholder primacy, pretakeover corporate-law doctrine upheld the
management discretion strand in virtually every conflict not colored by
unambiguous self-interest. 149 In fact, this stranglehold was so over-
whelming that it jeopardized the continued viability of the fundamental
146. See id. at 57-64.
147. See supra note 23; supra text accompanying note 81.
148. The late Professor Donald Schwartz described how the rationale of the "long run" only
pays
lip service to the profit concept because the analysis fails to test whether long-term profit
expectations were reasonably related to the decision. In other words, if wealth enhance-
ment justified the decision, the discounted value of anticipated profits should exceed pres-
ent foregone gains. The courts did not ask this question.
Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 511, 516 (1984). Robert Reich believes that "some of the expenditures... [made by business
executives to benefit shareholders over the long term] had little positive effect on the corporation's
bottom line." Reich, supra note 80, at 76.
149. See Palmiter, supra note 5, at 1361. Many corporate theorists consider a large measure of
managerial discretion to be consistent with shareholder primacy. See supra note 128. This position
is common among those who regard takeovers as a potent capital-market check on managerial dis-
cretion. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 100, at 705-06. Thus, this revisionist view of twenti-
eth-century corporate-law developments blossomed after the takeover phenomenon emerged and
now depends on continued takeover activity for its viability. See Palmiter, supra note 5, at 1360-62.
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postulate. From corporate law's standpoint, theory and reality were at
intolerable odds.
B. Corporate Takeovers and the Restoration of Shareholders
Into this conceptual maelstrom came hostile takeovers. This new
form of corporate transaction, little known before the mid-1960s,
150
threatened to break the skewed equipoise in which the management-dis-
cretion and shareholder-primacy strands of corporate law rested. As di-
rect invitations to purchase shareholder stock, tender offers
circumvented target management's firm grip on corporate activity and
empowered shareholders in a way lacking since the capital-owning and
capital-managing functions had first been sundered. As a result, they
introduced both untold promise and a major dilemma into corporate law.
While mouthing allegiance to the canon of shareholder primacy, the law
had failed to assure it. Now, with the emergence of a powerful securities-
market mechanism for imposing shareholder will on corporate affairs, it
seemed within reach. In retrospect, some would say it had been there all
along, waiting like a star to be discovered.151
Hostile takeovers, and the novel market-driven notion of corporate
law of which they are an integral part, would at last do what moribund
internal governance mechanisms, judicial review, and corporate deriva-
tive actions could not-police management discretion.15 2 They would
not rid management of discretion but would penalize its abuse and
thereby hold it in check. Takeovers promised to recapture true account-
ability to shareholders and achieve greater efficiency in the use of scarce
resources. Takeovers would redress an imbalance of power in the two-
party world of corporate law and reestablish internal systemic consis-
150. In 1966, there were more than 100 tender offers; in 1960, there were only 8. See SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP
AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter
S. REP. No. 550] (statement of Professor Samual L. Hayes III, Professor of Finance, Columbia
University). The total dollar value of such offers increased from $186 million in 1960 to nearly one
billion dollars in 1965. See Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover
Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcom. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 54 (1967) (testimony of Professor Samuel L. Hayes, III, Columbia
University). Professor Manne's seminal paper on the utility of tender offers and of an active market
for corporate control provided the intellectual foundation for arguments in favor of takeover activ-
ity. See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965).
151. An example is Professor Hetherington, who finds it "incredible that Berle and Means as-
signed so little importance to the role of the market in disciplining management." Hetherington,
Redefining the Task of Corporation Law, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 229, 236 (1985).
152. See supra note 44. For a recent and optimistic assessment of the governance function of
hostile takeovers, see Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARv. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct.




tency with the core premise of shareholder primacy. In short, takeovers
promised a true restoration and, from the limited perspective of corpo-
rate law, the promise was welcome and long overdue. As with so many
heralded changes, however, when they finally occur, a nagging disquie-
tude sets in and we begin to wonder whether what we got is really what
we wanted. 15
3
From a vantage point broader than corporate law's perspective, it is
worthwhile to ask whether we should simply forget decades of experience
with the corporate institution during which management fidelity to
shareholder interests was somewhat loose and strive to establish a more
vigilantly proshareholder vision. In other words, should the prospect of
a shareholder restoration be warmly greeted, or has the notion of share-
holder primacy rightly suffered such disabling violence that it should at
last be forthrightly dethroned? Given the unparalleled prosperity of the
pretakeover midtwentieth century, a prosperity enjoyed by shareholders
and nonshareholders, relatively few persons saw any compelling reason
for worrying about investor welfare or fretting about corporate law's ac-
countability dilemma. Outside the orbit of corporate law, the goal of
shareholder primacy seemed to coexist peacefully, if loosely, with the re-
ality of managerial liberty. As economic growth slowed in the 1970s and
1980s, however, and the United States witnessed a diminution in its for-
merly unrivaled economic superiority, the abilities and discretion of cor-
porate executives were subjected to renewed scrutiny from many
quarters, not simply from those who wanted to sharpen the focus on
shareholder interests.154 Thus, the intellectual impetus for institutional
reformation was born not from corporate law's lofty concerns (although
its storehouse of precepts was there in obliging support), but from the
more widely felt displeasure about the performance of American corpo-
rations in a world economy.
Although rethinking and rechanneling managerial discretion is an
uncontroversial goal, it does not follow that rearming shareholders is
equally unobjectionable. There are other social desiderata to be consid-
153. 'As only Garrison Keillor could put it: "Some luck lies in not getting what you thought you
wanted but getting what you have, which once you have it you may be smart enough to see is what
you would have wanted had you known." G. KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON DAYS 337 (1985).
154. Critiques of managers of publicly held corporations are legion. Nonetheless, the 1970s and
1980s witnessed a greatly heightened concern over managerial competence, a concern that came to
be encapsulated in the emphasis on American competitiveness in the world marketplace. According
to one prominent commentator, "One of the most ominous developments for the future of America
is the speed with which the Japanese are taking over the markets of the rapidly industrializing coun-
tries: Brazil, for instance, or India." Drucker, Corporate Takeovers-What Is to Be Done?, 82 PUB.
INT. 3, 13 (1986). Drucker believes that because management had failed to develop a wide base of
social support for its power, disenchantment with its performance, as manifested through high levels
of takeover activity, left managers vulnerable to attack. See id.
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ered. 155 Remember, though, that in the cramped domain of corporate
law, as manifested in corporate-law doctrine, 156 there are only two citi-
zens-shareholders and managers. With any realignment of power from
one party to the other, corporate law unrealistically implies that no one
else is affected. Other participants in corporate activity are unwelcome,
irrelevant interlopers whose interests are to be protected, if at all, by
mechanisms external to corporate law. As noted before, 157 the simplify-
ing assumptions of corporate law can be quite beneficial because they
allow a manageable piece of social reality-here, the shareholder-man-
ager axis-to be carved off and bracketed for special study. When the
desire for analytical ease overrides fidelity to an altered and unruly social
reality, however, and when the part under scrutiny is stubbornly
clutched and never fitted back into the larger whole, then descriptive
power is held captive to conceptual purity. 158 The risk of corporate the-
ory's unbending insularity to more expansive considerations, which se-
verely diminishes the usefulness of legal theory 'in the richer environs
where judges work to adapt legal doctrine to emerging phenomena, is
apparent in corporate law's neglect of two key problems associated with
hostile takeovers.
First, to what extent are nonshareholder interests adversely affected
by high levels of takeover activity? As stated, this question is an empiri-
cal one on which no consensus has been reached. Although this subject
is immensely important and controversial, corporate law has usually
shunned it. Yet, interestingly, corporate theory itself has provided a re-
cent glimmer of recognition that takeovers enable shareholders to do
more than right their relationship with management. Takeovers simulta-
neously equip shareholders to impose their markedly greater appetite for
risk (and debt) on the larger corporate ecosystem, namely on other par-
ties with fixed claims on corporate endeavor, to the disadvantage of those
155. Robert Reich has made this unorthodox observation as well: "[Too much attention to
shareholders' demands may in fact detract from the nation's long-term vitality-then the presump-
tive link between corporate executives' responsibilities to their shareholders and to the nation is
severed. What is good for the shareholders is not necessarily good for the nation." Reich, supra
note 80, at 77.
156. Bevis Longstreth, a former SEC Commissioner, recently expressed the sentiment that cor-
porate-law doctrine simply was not designed to address the issues raised by corporate takeovers:
"'[The business-judgment rule] was not intended to bear the weight of the conflicts that emerge
from change of ownership and control situations.'" Ex-SEC Member Urges Action to Protect Share-
holder Rights in Control Contests, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1494, 1495 (Oct. 6,
1989).
157. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
158. Richard Epstein neatly captures the tradeoff between descriptive richness and analytical
rigor: "The richer theory may lead to ad hoc explanations while the more powerful theory may miss
important features of the overall situation." R. Epstein, supra note 90, at 7.
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parties. 159 Some draw on this likelihood to suggest, with varying degrees
of enthusiasm, that corporate management must now include non-
shareholder interests under the protection of its fiduciary umbrella. 6
0
Thus, the takeover phenomenon has engendered unmistakable signs of
partial erosion in the formerly impregnable two-party sphere of corpo-
rate law. Others, however, rush to shore up its girders, adamantly insist-
ing that nonshareholders stay out of corporate law and seek refuge
elsewhere, perhaps through contract law or legislative intervention. 1
61
Second, those who continue to resist the incursion of non-
shareholder interests into the domain of judge-made corporate law imply
that the legislative branch is, today, equipped to deal with the repercus-
sions of takeovers. Yet, nothing approaching consensus exists on this
controversial issue. On many key points, we are operating in the world
of conjecture and possibility, not certainty. When it comes to legislation,
agnosticism breeds inaction. Thus, Congress does nothing. Delaware's
judges, however, do not have the luxury of inertia, and today they play
the pivotal role in speaking to takeovers. 162 Consequently, if non-
shareholder, nonmanagement considerations are to be judicially ac-
knowledged, they must fimd expression in preexisting judge-made
precepts. In today's binary world of corporate doctrine, these factors
must somehow align themselves with one or the other of the only two
mainstays in the corporate-law world-shareholders or managers. Given
the traditionally low level of corporate social responsibility in our soci-
ety163 and an understandable reluctance to expand the range of manage-
rial discretion further, it is not especially easy or satisfying to join
159. Even Professor Macey, a takeover enthusiast, concedes this point. See Macey, supra note
24, at 182. See generally Coffee, supra note 8, at 1-15 (recognizing that increased shareholder con-
trols threaten directors' managerial powers). Management-initiated restructurings designed to pre-
empt unfriendly takeover attempts also have this effect, although incumbent senior managers remain
intact by placating shareholders at the possible expense of nonmanagement third parties such as
employees.
160. Many states have passed laws declaring that in making corporate decisions, a director may
consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-313(e)
(1989) (permitting directors to look to the interests of employees, customers, creditors, and suppli-
ers, as well as at community and societal considerations, in determining the best interests of the
corporation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251, subdiv. 5 (West Supp. 1990) (same); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 12423.1(a)(2) (Purdon 1988) (authorizing directors to consider the effect of any action on
employees, suppliers, and customers, as well as on communities in which corporate facilities are
located, and also to consider "all other pertinent factors").
161. See Macey, supra note 24, at 200-01; Ribstein, supra note 24.
162. One attribute of the judicial law-making process is that, within jurisdictional and proce-
dural limits, citizen disputants can "force" judges to address problems in a more direct and immedi-
ate way than they can compel legislators to act. The Delaware Chancery Court responds to litigant
entreaties with remarkable speed. See Cary, supra note 143, at 686-92 (discussing the relative free-
dom to litigate corporate claims in Delaware and the role of Delaware's legislature and judiciary in
developing the state's corporate law).
163. In describing the extent to which statutes and cases authorize corporate management to
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noninvestor elements with management. At the same time, although
noninvestors might generally loathe managerial discretion over corporate
affairs as much as shareholders, on the takeover front the interests of
shareholders and nonshareholders may seriously diverge, making them
even more unlikely allies. Thus, while nonshareholder concerns are not
easily fitted into the straitjacket of traditional corporate-law doctrine,
their interests in takeovers are more closely linked to managers than to
shareholders.
The question remains, nonetheless, whether judge-made corporate
law should acknowledge the effects of hostile takeovers on non-
shareholder groups through an expansive interpretation of the manage-
ment-discretion strand of corporate doctrine. In tilting the internal
balance of power away from management and back to shareholders,
takeovers are an attractive antidote for corporate law's internal set of
problems. Many in corporate law embrace takeovers for that effect alone
and without regard to their effect on others outside the corporate govern-
ance scheme. These observers take our lack of information on certain
nonshareholder dimensions of the takeover issue to be irrelevant to
judge-made corporate law as it continues in a self-absorbed search for
answers to its own inner quandary. So long as we know that sharehold-
ers profit handsomely from takeovers-as we undeniably do know ' 6-
many contend that the mission for corporate law is obvious. It should
permit shareholders to gather rosebuds while they may, 165 leaving to
other disciplines and institutions the task of dealing with whatever unde-
sirable outgrowth ensues.
Still, just as sanction for the limited reach of the corporate-law do-
main must be found in underlying social norms, 166 so too with the bipo-
lar world of corporate-law doctrine. In advocating that judge-made
corporate doctrine should embrace takeovers as a vital instrument for
vindicating shareholder rights and achieving order in the closed world of
expend corporate funds for nonshareholder purposes, Professor Davis sums up the magnitude of
such expenditures:
While the authorities to date are too sparse to permit meaningful assessment of just how far
the corporation may go in improving the world at the expense of its shareholders, it could
have been said with confidence, as recently as ten years ago, that little exists to suggest that
the level of expenditures contemplated by these express authorizations rises to what an
accountant would describe as material in relation to the corporation's overall financial
condition.
Davis, supra note 63, at 8. Davis goes on to note, however, that management consideration of
nonshareholder interests in the takeover context has "called that conclusion into question." Id.
164. See supra note 19.
165. With apologies to Robert Herrick. See Herrick, To the Virgins To Make Much of Time, in
I NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1319, 1319 (4th ed. 1979).
166. See supra subparts 1I(B) and 1I(C).
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corporate law, takeover enthusiasts overlook a basic point. They forget
that, as a normative end, shareholder primacy in this new setting must
find "substantial support in the community" 167 and that traditional cor-
porate-law doctrine, having submerged that norm for so long, will not
radically change course without clear evidence that such support exists.
Judges will not hasten to achieve internal systemic coherence for the
field of corporate law at the cost of sacrificing congruence with deep-
seated notions about the appropriate meaning of corporate endeavor.1 6
8
The parameters of lawmaking are not as cordoned off from social forces
as the simplifying assumptions and logical imperatives of model building.
By no means would an alert judge conclude today that the full-throttled
proshareholder position espoused by takeover proponents strikes a re-
sponsive chord in other groups in society. 169 Furthermore, because judi-
cial concern over the effect of takeovers on noninvestors can be housed
only in the management-discretion strand of corporate doctrine, however
ill-designed for that purpose, judicial reservations about the overall im-
pact and value of takeovers-doubts that can and should inform corpo-
rate doctrine lest judges undermine their own legitimacy for the sake of
preserving corporate law's tidy symmetry-will lead to continued pre-
sumptive emphasis on managerial prerogative. 170 Of course, many con-
strue such an emphasis as evidence of the judiciary's enduring thralldom
to corporate management. Viewed through the lens of corporate govern-
ance, that interpretation is perfectly sensible. Viewed from the wider an-
gle of corporate purpose, however, such a reading is far too myopic. For
all the theoretical discussion about the liberating effect of takeovers on
corporate law and corporate activity, the dynamics of judicial law mak-
ing dictate that judicial underscoring of managerial prerogative will per-
sist unless and until devotion to the norm of shareholder primacy
demonstrably speaks to widely held expectations about corporate en-
deavor and succeeds in drawing those considerations under its own doc-
trinal mantle. Today, the notion of shareholder primacy has not
achieved those goals in state legislatures and, in spite of considerable
growing, solicitude for shareholder welfare over the past few years, it
meets stem resistance in Delaware's judge-made doctrine. The next sec-
tion addresses these observations.
167. M. EISENBERG, supra note 47, at 15.
168. For Professor Eisenberg's discussion of "systemic consistency" and "social congruence,"
see id. at 44-47.
169. See supra note 125.
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IV. The Response of Corporate Law to Takeovers
A. The Legislative Response
Elsewhere I have described how state legislatures have reacted to
the takeover phenomenon. 171 Interestingly, to pass constitutional mus-
ter, states have lodged antitakeover measures in their general corporation
statutes, thereby reclaiming primary regulatory authority over takeovers
as capital-market transactions.1 72 This section briefly summarizes the
motivations behind these responses and the manner in which they reject
maximization of shareholder welfare as the primary objective of a corpo-
ration confronted with the prospect of a takeover. To the extent legisla-
tion is an important instrument for divining how social norms bear on a
legal issue, these statutes provide a crude but revealing insight into the
takeover views of a sizable segment of society. These views may not be
wholly unselfish, enlightened, or efficacious; but they exist and cannot be
discarded as so much legal folderol.
Most states have enacted legislation to regulate takeover contests
because they feared the disruptive effects of increasing hostile-takeover
activity on their economies. Delaware's recent statute alone governs
about half of all companies listed with the New York Stock Exchange.
173
The overwhelming majority of public corporations are thus protected by
state legislation.
All recent state takeover statutes share a common purpose: To dis-
courage hostile takeover attempts by creating obstacles that require ap-
proval by target managers, thereby causing delay, uncertainty, and
increased costs.' 74 Many of these laws use the rhetoric of shareholder
welfare, but their primary goal is to protect nonshareholder interests
thought to be affected adversely by hostile takeovers.
States recognize that takeover battles may assist bidders, financial
intermediaries, and target-company shareholders, both to enhance their
wealth and to establish an effective, if blunt, governance mechanism.
Such contests might-although this effect is much more controversial-
fulfill society's desire for a more efficient use of economic resources.
States also perceive, however, that all those benefits are likely to be real-
ized by the residents of other states, leaving the economic and social costs
171. See Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 23, at 1873-82; Missing the Point, supra note
23, at 848-53.
172. See Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 23, at 1883.
173. See id. at 1862 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1974 & Supp. 1988) (currently codi-
fied at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983 & Supp. 1988)).
174. See id. at 1862-63.
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of corporate disruption to fall disproportionately on the state having the
closest connection to the target company.
The increasingly typical "bust-up" takeover is of particular concern
to state legislators. In this type of takeover, the bidder seeks to profit
from large-scale asset liquidations or corporate restructurings that neces-
sitate plant closings, layoffs, and relocations. 175 Such takeovers "are be-
lieved to threaten jobs, established customer and supplier relationships,
tax revenues, charitable contributions, and other economic and social
benefits provided by resident companies to local communities." 176 These
local concerns have occupied the legislators' attention as they have re-
sponded to heightened takeover activity. Thus, for economic and polit-
ical reasons, the states' chief motivation in passing takeover laws has
been to deter tender offers, not to promote shareholder welfare. 177 More-
over, state legislators have begun to acknowledge this motivation more
candidly.178 Shareholder primacy, at least in the takeover context, has
been renounced.
B. The Judicial Response
1. Judicial Ambivalence: Restraining and Enhancing Managerial
Discretion.-Most of Delaware's takeover decisions arise in the same
procedural posture. The hostile bidder or target-company shareholders
implore one of the chancellors to enjoin various defensive measures
adopted by target management, such as lockup options or shareholder-
rights plans (poison pills). 179 In addressing the complex issues raised by
hostile takeovers, the Delaware judiciary has only a limited repertoire of
legal rules. Moreover, these rules were developed in another epoch and
for another purpose: To evaluate shareholder charges of managerial in-
competence or disloyalty.'80 Although they arise in diverse factual cir-
cumstances, the vast body of traditional corporate-law cases pit the
interests of the corporate enterprise and the body of shareholders, on one
side, against the interests of corporate management, on the other. If
175. See id. at 1863.
176. Id.
177. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 502 (7th Cir.)
(asserting that states are not constitutionally required to treat shareholder welfare as "summum
bonum"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
178. See Missing the Point, supra note 23, at 848-50.
179. The Delaware Chancery Court is a court of equity. The Court has jurisdiction over tradi-
tionally equitable matters and over those actions in which equitable relief is sought. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1975). If legal relief is available before another court, the chancery court is
without jurisdiction. See id. at § 342. This Article uses the term "common law" to describe the
work of these equity judges, both for ease of reference and because they use the common-law method
of adjudication.
180. See supra notes 129, 156 and accompanying text.
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managers shirk responsibility or engage in unfair self-dealing, they dam-
age the corporate enterprise by lowering net profits or asset values. They
also harm the shareholders, both by lessening the amount of funds avail-
able for distribution and by potentially reducing the market price of the
company's stock. This identity of corporate and shareholder interests in
relation to management interests accounts for a phrase that surfaced
early in pretakeover corporate law and that recurs throughout decisions
evaluating management's compliance with its duties-corporate manage-
ment is said to owe fiduciary duties to the "corporation and its
shareholders." 18'
Until 1985, defensive measures adopted in response to a hostile
overture were analyzed in much the same way as challenges to more con-
ventional managerial behavior.18 2 The standard was whether the actions
fell outside the spacious mantle of the business-judgment rule, a most
unlikely prospect. In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,' s3 however, the
Delaware Supreme Court articulated a modified business-judgment rule
for reviewing defensive tactics because it recognized that management
responses to unsolicited takeover bids differed from routine operating be-
havior.'8 4 The key distinction, according to the court, was the presence
of management self-interest-an ingrained tendency to resist a bid purely
to preserve control of the corporation rather than to advance shareholder
welfare. 
8 5
In that same decision, however, the Delaware Supreme Court did
something less visible, but equally, if not more, important. It sanctioned,
albeit in dicta, the propriety of management's consideration of noninves-
tor interests in formulating defensive responses. The court asserted that
in analyzing the effect of a takeover bid on the corporate enterprise, the
second prong of the modified business-judgment rule analysis,186 direc-
tors may consider, among other matters, the impact on "creditors, cus-
tomers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally."' 8 7
In effect, the Delaware Supreme Court differentiated takeover re-
181. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
182. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice,
480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
183. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
184. Unocal requires target directors to prove the existence of reasonable grounds for believing
that a takeover attempt endangers "corporate policy and effectiveness." Id. at 955. This burden is
satisfied "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation." Id. (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199
A.2d 548, 555 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964)). In addition, a defensive measure must be "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed. This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid
and its effect on the corporate enterprise." Id.
185. See id. at 954.




sponses from the normal run of managerial decision making in two re-
spects-the presence of managerial self-interest and the potential adverse
impact on nonshareholder constituencies. The latter dimension seemed
oddly out of place in the bilateral world of corporate-law doctrine. To be
sure, since Merrick Dodd's 1932 article on the subject, 188 commentators
occasionally have advocated the inclusion of such factors in manage-
ment's field of fiduciary concern.189 Certain courts had even mildly ac-
credited nonshareholder interests before, in the charitable contribution
context 190 and in other settings as well. 191 Yet the Delaware Supreme
Court had never been so candid about the subject in the takeover
arena. 192
This unexpected opening was not lost on perceptive members of the
corporate bar. Yet another ingredient in the vast mix of factors to be
considered by target management had fortuitously entered the picture.
Target-company lawyers saw what Adolf Berle had seen in responding to
Dodd's suggestion that management should be free to take account of
manifold interests: 193 introducing nonshareholder interests into the deci-
sional matrix would further enhance managerial discretion and serve to
blunt the pointed focus on shareholder well-being. To management and
its counselors this development constituted a great advantage, one that
could redirect Unocal's spotlight away from managerial self-interest.
Now the law allowed target management to rebuff takeovers not simply
out of the entrenchment motives recognized by the Unocal court, but
valiantly on behalf of nonshareholders. The demands on management in
the takeover setting would thus be qualitatively different than the de-
mands in the operating-decision context. In the latter context, at least in
188. See Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1160-61
(1932).
189. See, e.g., Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L. REv. 157, 204-
08 (1970) (arguing that aggregate corporate social welfare expenditures will result in the fulfillment
of many business objectives including the attainment of a more productive work force); Conard,
Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941, 959-61 (1977) (advocating that cor-
porations reserve board seats for some directors who would function solely as representatives of
customer and employee nonshareholders).
190. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 43.
191. See id. at 50-52.
192. One wonders what moved Delaware's judges to enumerate nonshareholder factors as a
proper element in managerial deliberation. Whether genuine judicial solicitude for these factors
exists or whether they serve as a screen for shoring up managerial discretion, the rhetoric clearly
looks outside the management-shareholder sphere to buttress the decision to allocate corporate
power in a particular direction. See id. at 43-50; see also Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 167, 2
A.2d 225, 238 (1938) (arguing that the law of trusts should apply to corporate governance issues),
aff'd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). Thus, issues of corporate governance, ostensibly involving only man-
agers and shareholders, are not resolved solely by reference to manager and shareholder interests but
require grounding in factors outside the traditional corporate paradigm.
193. See Berle, supra note 66, at 1371-72.
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theory, loyalties undeniably ran to shareholder-wealth maximization,
even at the expense of other participants. In takeovers, the Delaware
Supreme Court seemed to be saying, multiple interests could be enter-
tained in a way that might further loosen the shareholders' already tenu-
ous claim to primacy. The very next year, however, the Delaware
Supreme Court confronted and quashed, at least in part, this unorthodox
reading of Unocal.
2. The Halting Emergence of Shareholder Primacy.-In Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 194 the Delaware Supreme
Court noted that it was addressing for the first time the "extent to which
a corporation may consider the impact of a takeover threat on constitu-
encies other than shareholders." 195 MacAndrews and Forbes made an
offer to purchase Revlon that the Revlon board of directors rejected.
The board adopted a poison pill rights plan and eventually granted a
lockup option to Forstmann, Little & Co. as part of accepting Forst-
mann's offer to purchase Revlon. MacAndrews sued to enjoin the
lockup option. The Delaware Chancery Court issued an injunction
96
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.
197
The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis by reciting the
common, but fuzzy, adage that directors owe fiduciary duties to the
"corporation and its shareholders."' 198 The court then upheld the initial
implementation of the rights plan because it advanced corporate interests
and because it served the best interests of shareholders as well by
"spurr[ing] the bidding to new heights."' 199 Only as the court addressed
and invalidated the lockup option did it recognize the need to clarify and
distinguish management's duty to shareholders from its duty to the corpo-
ration. The court found a change in duty so that maximizing the take-
over premium for shareholders should have formed the directors' sole
motivation when a sale of the company became inevitable.200 Once di-
rectors are transformed into auctioneers, directorial solicitude for
noninvestor (in this case, creditor) interests or for preserving the corpo-
rate enterprise expires, overborne by the charge to garner top dollar for
the stock.
2° 1
194. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
195. Id. at 176.
196. Id. at 175.
197. Id. at 185.
198. Id. at 179.
199. Id. at 181.
200. See id. at 182.
201. The court asserted that a target-company board of directors "may have regard for various
constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accru-
913
Texas Law Review
Unmistakably, in Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court sought to
contain the potentially mutinous Unocal dicta and to resurrect the pri-
macy of the shareholder-welfare strand of corporate law that, like an old
soldier, is widely revered but mostly ignored. One salient question after
Revlon was whether the shareholder-primacy strand would be given full
play and made paramount at all times or whether it would apply only in
the narrow circumstances of a Revlon-like multibidder contest for con-
trol. In 1987, in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,202 the Dela-
ware Supreme Court tempered Revlon's auction mandate by upholding
Newmont's defensive actions against T. Boone Pickens. The court em-
phasized that no generally applicable duty to auction a company under
siege existed. Only the directors' conclusion that a sale of the target
company had become "inevitable" triggered such an obligation. In refus-
ing to unleash the full force of shareholder primacy, the court reiterated
that a target board outside the Revlon posture had broad discretion to
consider the impact of a takeover bid on nonshareholder constituen-
cies. 203 Once in the Revlon mode, however, management's range of ac-
tion narrowed considerably; top price for the shareholders was the sole
aim.
Thus, the obvious way for target-company management to subvert
immediate shareholder primacy and retain maximum flexibility is to stay
out of the Revlon mode. As could be expected, many decisions have
grappled with the question of whether, under the circumstances
presented, management had crossed the Revlon threshold.2°4 The Dela-
ware Supreme Court recently underscored that Revlon applies in a vari-
ety of contexts, "whether the 'sale' takes the form of an active auction, a
management buyout, or a 'restructuring.' "205 Noting that the Revlon
mode may be entered by diverse paths and that its threshold may be
crossed unwittingly, the court also emphasized that
not every offer or transaction affecting the corporate structure in-
vokes the Revlon duties. A refusal to entertain offers may comport
with a valid exercise of business judgment. Circumstances may
dictate that an offer be rebuffed, given the nature and timing of the
offer; .. . the alternatives available and their effect on the various
constituencies, particularly the stockholders; . .. and any special
ing to the stockholders." Id. But the court went on to say that "concern for non-stockholder inter-
ests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is
to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder." Id.
202. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
203. See id. at 1341-42.
204. See supra note 30.
205. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del. 1989).
914
Vol. 68:865, 1990
Corporate Life and Corporate Law
factors bearing on stockholder and public interests.20 6
Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court simultaneously stressed
both the unexpected reach of Revlon and its clear limitation. It paid trib-
ute to the norm of shareholder primacy while refusing to give it a free
rein. In doing so, it gallantly sought to avoid a calamitous showdown
between the two strands of corporate law and, instead, strove to strike a
provisional accord.
Notwithstanding the Delaware Supreme Court's enduring approval
of management attentiveness to nonshareholder interests outside the Rev-
Ion mode, no target company appears to have bottomed its business or
litigation strategy solely on the need to protect those interests. Instead,
management often concurrently asserts that its resistance is actually ben-
eficial for shareholders. Although in form a tender offer aims directly at
shareholders and appears to involve a simple decision on their part to sell
or hold stock, management intervenes on the ground that its involvement
can actually enhance shareholder well-being. Management undertakes to
convert a pure stock disposition matter, taking place on national capital
markets that are admittedly beyond management's sphere of influence,
into a corporate matter, taking place in a realm in which its sovereignty
is well established. Management achieves this conversion by pursuing a
variety of tactics, perhaps finding a friendly merger candidate, altering
the target company's asset composition or capital structure in some way,
or causing the company to adopt one or more defensive measures. By
recharacterizing the key moves in a takeover battle as corporate, not
shareholder, efforts, management surmounts the risk that shareholder
autonomy over stock alienation will work to its disadvantage.
Moreover, because management seizes the initiative and acts
through the corporation, ostensibly for the benefit of shareholders,
judges reviewing these defensive measures evaluate only the propriety of
such corporate action, not the substantive impact on shareholders.
Judges conduct this review by simplistic reliance on well-settled prece-
dent-developed outside the takeover context-that courts will not dis-
turb management's business judgment. Almost as if by alchemy, the
whole complexion of takeovers is brilliantly transmogrified, and manage-
rial dominion over their resolution is reclaimed. Just as apparent solici-
tude for nonshareholders amplifies managerial discretion, so too does the
companion strategy of remolding the whole tender offer process, pur-
portedly to better serve shareholders, 20 7 into a corporate matter. Man-
206. Id. at 1285 n.35 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
207. There are plausible reasons for permitting managerial intervention in takeover contests,
even where shareholder primacy is the agreed-upon objective. First, although quite rare today, two-
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agement discretion leads at once in opposite directions.
The precise manner in which target-company management paternal-
istically, if double mindedly, endeavors to make tender offers corporate
matters, thereby depriving shareholders of sole decision-making author-
ity for the paradoxical purpose of "helping" them, varies from case to
case. One of the most common measures is a poison pill. Although the
court upheld the implementation of such a measure in Moran v. House-
hold International, Inc.,208 the more important question-a question left
open in Moran-is whether and when target management must redeem a
pill. As courts examine that question, once again the twin strands of
corporate-law doctrine pull in opposite directions.
There are credible reasons for management's participation in the
tender-offer process, even from a shareholder-primacy perspective.20 9 As
the court recognized in Unocal, however, such rationales for involvement
might simply be a pretext for preserving sufficient managerial leeway to
defeat a bid by refusing to redeem a pill. Because a court's analytical
tools for sorting out improper from proper behavior are quite crude, it is
likely that management will engage in self-serving behavior that escapes
judicial sanction. After all, once a court acknowledges that management
intervention might be proper to serve shareholder primacy and that this
intervention necessarily takes the form of activity channeled through the
corporate machinery, the court abruptly confronts the historic practice
of meekly deferring to such company actions. And this precedent-
grounded in the normative belief that public officials should stay out of
private business affairs-is applicable even though the maneuver is not
an operating decision but is manifestly an action taken in the takeover
context and even though Unocal's modified business-judgment rule val-
iantly strives to be sensitive to the substantial risk of managerial self-
interest. Short of altogether wresting takeover responses from the hands
of corporate management or retrospectively reviewing the substantive
tier bids serve to coerce target shareholders in a way that they are largely powerless to resist. See
Missing the Point, supra note 23, at 846-47. The presence of target-company management compels a
bidder to treat shareholders more even handedly and thus counteracts the structural disadvantage
faced by shareholders receiving such a bid. Indeed, it was this rationale that convinced the Supreme
Court to uphold Indiana's takeover statute against constitutional attack on the pretext that it was, at
bottom, a shareholder protection measure. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,
93-94 (1987); Johnson, supra note 25. Second, even in structurally noncoercive, all-cash all-shares
bids, management's resistance might help overcome a financially inadequate bid because manage-
ment can do what large numbers of dispersed shareholders cannot-negotiate for a higher price by
fighting the overture. Studies have empirically validated the value of management's measured resist-
ance in achieving premiums for target shareholders higher than those initially offered. See Jarrell,
The Wealth Effects ofLitigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J.L. & ECON. 151,
174-75 (1985).
208. 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985).
209. See supra note 207.
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propriety of such gambits, 2 10 permitting initial managerial involvement
in takeover contests for the alleged purpose of protecting shareholders
inevitably concedes the impropriety of scrutinizing too closely the way in
which management fulfills its task. Once the camel's nose enters the
tent, the rest of its body is sure to follow. This dilemma results when the
supposedly core norm of shareholder primacy confronts the even
stronger historic practice of judicial restraint.
Thus, in post-Revlon cases there are two diametrically opposed justi-
fications for management's entanglement in the tender-offer process.
First, management can consider nonshareholder or "corporate" interests.
Second, management can protect the interest of shareholders in achiev-
ing current share price maximization. In quite dissimilar ways, each jus-
tification threatens to subvert the objective of shareholder primacy by
validating management involvement. Operating within the shareholder-
manager dyad of corporate-law theory, post-Revlon decisions have
gamely struggled to reconcile the twin strands of shareholder primacy
and management discretion. Expressed doctrinally, a court must first
determine whether the Revlon mode has been entered; if so, the sole aim
of management is to maximize current shareholder welfare; if not, the
court must determine whether other circumstances mandate judicial
overturning of management's actions to achieve the hallowed norm of
shareholder primacy. Under the latter scenario, the practice of judicial
restraint usually meant the subjugation of shareholder welfare. Thus, the
premise of takeovers restoring shareholder primacy to corporate law was
in jeopardy. Late in 1988, however, two Delaware Chancery Court deci-
sions seized on theprocess value of shareholder autonomy over stock dis-
position in tender offers as a means of rescuing the substantive norm of
shareholder primacy. 211 In this way, that central norm might once and
for all be freed of the drag of managerial discretion and elevated to the
stature promised by orthodoxy and revived by Revlon.
3. The Tentative Ascendancy of Shareholders.-In City Capital As-
sociates Limited Partnership v. Interco, Inc. ,212 the Delaware Chancery
Court countenanced the propriety of management's integral involvement
in a battle for corporate control but also proscribed that involvement
210. Professors Gilson and Kraakman advocate the introduction of at least a measure of "sub-
stance" into judicial review. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 88, at 266. This position repre-
sents a preference for shareholder welfare over a policy of deference by public officials (judges) in
corporate affairs.
211. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1057-60 (Del. Ch. 1988);
City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798-800 (Del. Ch.), appeal
dismissed as moot, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
212. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed as moot, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
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when the court believed it was inconsistent with shareholder welfare.
City Capital Associates made a seventy-four dollar all-cash all-shares
tender offer for Interco common stock, subject to the redemption of the
target's poison pill. The Interco board rejected the bid as inadequate,
proposed its own restructuring plan consisting of a package of cash and
securities estimated to be worth a minimum of seventy-six dollars for
each share, and refused to redeem the pill. The restructuring plan in-
cluded the sale of Ethan Allen, a substantial division of the company.
City Capital Associates sued to enjoin the restructuring and for an order
requiring the target board to redeem the poison pill.
2 13
Chancellor Allen ordered the target board to withdraw the pill.
214
He first emphasized that the bid was not coercive and that "in the special
case of a tender offer for all shares, the threat posed, if any, is not impor-
tantly [sic] to corporate policies ... but rather the threat, if any, is most
directly to shareholder interests. ' 215 Management was not precluded
from becoming involved just because the case implicated a shareholder
rather than a corporate matter, however. A bid, even if not structurally
coercive, might be financially inadequate, and management might be able
to extract a higher bid or arrange a more valuable alternative. Allen
stressed, however, that there were limits to management participation.
In Interco, the contest had neared its end stage, and although manage-
ment had neither negotiated with the bidder for a higher price nor insti-
tuted a full-blown Revlon auction, it had generated and narrowed the
options for shareholders leaving two functionally equivalent offers-the
hostile bid and the management-sponsored restructuring.216 According
to Chancellor Allen, at that point, to preserve the division of decision-
making power basic to our corporate governance scheme, management
had to step aside and let shareholders decide between the hostile bid and
the restructuring alternative because the choice was a quintessential
213. Id. at 789-91.
214. See id. at 800.
215. Id. at 797. Chancellor Allen thus collapses the historic distinction between the corporation
and the shareholders. As a matter of logic and business reality, the fact that a tender offer is for all
shares does not mean that there is not a threat to corporate policies as well as to shareholders'
financial interests. What Allen implies, but does not say, is that in such a bid, shareholders' financial
interests are more deserving of managerial efforts than corporate policies. That conclusion, which
drops the corporate enterprise from the analysis, may serve shareholder welfare, but it inexplicably
discards traditional formulations of managerial duty as running to the corporation as well as to the
shareholders. For that reason, the conclusion deserves more careful analysis. One obvious explana-
tion for Allen's statement in Interco is that management itself, in proposing its own restructuring,
had essentially abandoned corporate policies as they had previously existed and thus was hardly in a
position to defend them. See id. at 799. That explanation, however, leaves Allen's statement unex-
plained in the case of a target that refuses to defend itself by altering its pretakeover policies.
216. See id. at 798.
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shareholder matter.217 Chancellor Allen asserted that depriving share-
holders of the ability to accept a noncoercive offer would "be so inconsis-
tent with widely shared notions of appropriate corporate governance as
to threaten to diminish the legitimacy and authority of our corporate
law. ' '21 8 This observation was germane to the outcome of the case be-
cause, in the words of Chancellor Allen, "corporation law exists, not as
an isolated body of rules and principles, but rather in a historical setting
and as a part of a larger body of law premised upon shared values. '219
Thus, Allen explicitly referred to underlying social norms to support his
decision and thereby grasped the critical need for corporate doctrine to
be rooted in those norms. Yet, Allen looked to social norms to highlight
only one particular value-shareholder autonomy over disposition of pri-
vate property. His choice underscores shareholder primacy in corporate
affairs but, of itself, does not prevent the infiltration of additional norms
into corporate law or dictate the preeminence of one norm-shareholder
primacy-over others. As explained in the discussion of accountability,
once one resorts to social norms originating outside corporate law, one
meets a disarming panoply of such norms.220 The really intriguing ques-
tion is which norm will hold sway over the others, and for how long.
Even Chancellor Allen paid only partial homage to the norm of
shareholder autonomy. Although he ordered redemption of the poison
pill, Chancellor Allen refused to construe the sale of the Ethan Allen
division as triggering a full-scale Revlon auction of the target, and he
declined to enjoin the proposed sale of that division. 221 Interco argued
that, unlike a response to a tender offer, the decision to sell the Ethan
Allen division was a corporate decision supported by sound business rea-
sons rather than a shareholder stock disposition matter.222 The defensive
strategy of recharacterization obviously succeeded because Chancellor
Allen accorded the decision the substantial deference of a conventional
business judgment. 223 He reached this conclusion even though the sale of
the division would drastically change Interco and even though he ac-
knowledged that the sale "might imperil CCA's ability to complete its
transaction" 224 and thereby effectively deprive target shareholders of the
217. See id. at 799.
218. Id. at 800.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
221. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 801.
222. See id. at 794-95.
223. See id. at 800-01.
224. Id. at 801. In fact, the bidder withdrew its offer after Chancellor Allen's decision.
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very financial choice Allen sought to preserve in ordering the pill
redeemed.
Although that portion of Interco ordering redemption of the poison
pill was denounced in some quarters for its severe proshareholder tilt,225
rarely has a case better illuminated how the shareholder-primacy strand
of corporate law-apparently bolstered by the order to redeem the
poison pill-continually encounters the threat of subduction and annul-
ment by the management-discretion strand, which was vindicated by
Chancellor Allen's refusal to enjoin the sale of Ethan Allen. Even
though the opinion is at war with itself, it still represents a ringing, if
partial, endorsement of shareholder primacy as achieved through direct
shareholder choice rather than through management's acting as the en-
lightened agent of shareholders. As such, Allen's opinion represents
both a decisive doctrinal triumph for shareholder welfare and a state-
ment of judicial approbation of a more vigilantly proinvestor conception
of corporate purpose.
Soon after Interco, an even clearer repudiation of management's un-
qualified power to pursue what it claims is maximization of shareholder
welfare appeared in Grand Metropolitan Public Limited Co. v. Pillsbury
Co. 226 In that case, Grand Metropolitan made a noncoercive, sixty-three
dollar all-cash all-shares offer for Pillsbury stock. The Pillsbury board of
directors spumed the offer as inadequate, refused to redeem its poison
pill, and announced that it was developing a restructuring plan that
would result in the spin-off and sale of certain of its assets over the next
several years.227 The Delaware Chancery Court ordered the Pillsbury
board to redeem the pill.228 In reaching that decision, the court observed
that Pillsbury's management did not argue that resisting the bid was nec-
essary to protect the corporate entity or nonshareholder constituen-
cies.229 Consequently, the court asserted: "Whatever danger there is
relates solely to shareholders and that concerns price only. ' 230 Thus,
although not implicated (or at least not raised) in that case, non-
shareholder interests clearly had penetrated the consciousness of corpo-
rate law.
Having eschewed the role of keeper of the enterprise and its
225. See Meyers, supra note 36, at 75 (describing critical reaction to the Interco decision).
226. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
227. Id. at 1057.
228. See id. at 1060.
229. See id. at 1054-6. Indeed, one-half of the shares in employee pension plans had been
tendered to the bidder.
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noninvestor constituencies, Pillsbury management brazenly asserted two
claims in its defense. First, it conceded that the relevant benchmark for
assessing its behavior was shareholder welfare and claimed that its re-
structuring plan was financially superior to the hostile bid.231 Second,
management argued that it, not shareholders, should choose between the
two options.232 The court, however, observed that for shareholders to
obtain the projected higher share price under management's alternative,
they would have to "be patient and endure for a long time, perhaps until
1992 or 1993."233 The court also noted that eighty-seven percent of the
stock had already been tendered to the bidder and that shareholders
stood to lose up to $1.9 billion dollars if the offer was defeated. 234 As in
Interco, the court thus confirmed management's right to be involved in
the takeover process but also reiterated the court's power to halt manage-
ment's involvement when shareholder interests-mainly preservation of
shareholder choice between two options-are jeopardized. 235
Interco and Pillsbury appeared to make an unprecedented break-
through in corporate law. Rebuffing management's efforts to equate
their participation in tender offers to their role in normal operating deci-
sions, the judiciary sought to maintain for shareholders the benefits of
managerial involvement while safeguarding them from the risks of an
unchecked discretion that might derogate shareholder welfare. At last,
takeovers appeared to be fulfilling their promise of engineering the de-
cades-long quest for accountability and for a restoration of shareholders
to the center of the corporate stage. And the breakthrough was happen-
ing within the clumsy confines of traditional corporate-law doctrine. It
seemed that the Delaware judiciary was forcefully reminding manage-
ment and others that corporations under siege were, as always, to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth while giving shareholders a vital say in how this
goal was accomplished.
At a more theoretical level, the Interco and Pillsbury decisions
brought a considerable measure of consistency to the field of corporate
law.236 The courts seemed to have successfully raised the core norm of
shareholder primacy to the stature that it had been professed in theory-
but doubted in reality-to occupy. It was as if the chancellors had lifted
the domain of corporate law like a billiard table to return the balls to the
231. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1057.
232. See id. at 1059.
233. Id. at 1057.
234. See id. at 1058.
235. See id. at 1060 n.10.
236. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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shareholder end of thoe table. Or so it seemed from within the sanctum of
corporate law.
But as Professor Eisenberg has cautioned, systemic consistency is
only one facet of the larger quality of coherence that we crave.237 The
other aspect is social congruence, ringing true with norms transcending
the artificial bounds of corporate law and concerning the deeper purpose
of corporate endeavor. Was the rekindling of shareholder primacy in
harmony with those norms? As the Delaware judiciary nearly completed
the Sisyphean task of rolling the rock of systemic consistency to the top
of the hill, Chancellor Allen hesitantly turned to check on the rock of
social congruence; two decisions rendered by Allen in 1989 suggest that
he saw it tumbling down the slope.
4. The Onset of Misgivings. -The case of TW Services, Inc. v. SWT
Acquisition Corp. 238 involved a bidder's request for an order requiring the
target's board of directors to redeem its poison pill.23 9 The bidder had
made an all-cash all-shares bid that resulted in the tender of eighty-eight
percent of the target company's stock. The bid was subject to several
conditions, including board approval of the offer and board consent to
enter into a merger agreement. 24° This unusual latter condition gave
Chancellor Allen an easy way out of the case. It also provided a risk-free
opportunity for Chancellor Allen to engage in an extended public rumi-
nation on some very fundamental matters.
241
The target board's response to the bid was to refuse to negotiate
with the bidder and to refuse to redeem the pill or to take any short-term
value-maximizing action whatsoever. 242 Instead, the board argued that it
was entitled to manage the corporation in the long-run interests of share-
holders and, accordingly, had no obligation to develop an alternative to
the hostile overture, which it persistently characterized as "merely an
invitation to negotiate. ' 243 Without even applying Unocal's modified
business-judgment rule, Chancellor Allen declined to order redemption
of the pill.244 Delaware law provides that a merger agreement, unlike a
straightforward tender offer, is to be initiated by and requires the ap-
proval of the board of directors. Because the target board had refused to
take such action, the board's decision was subject to less stringent tradi-
237. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 47, at 44-47.
238. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
239. See id. 1 94334, at 92174.
240. See id. 94334, at 92176.
241. See id. 94334, at 92178-82.
242. See id. 94334, at 92178.
243. Id. 94334, at 92176.
244. See id. 1 94334, at 92182.
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tional business-judgment review. 245
Although not strictly pertinent to resolution of the case, by far the
most fascinating part of TWServices is Chancellor Allen's discussion of
precisely whose interests are entitled to protection in a takeover. He be-
gins by observing that the ubiquitous phrase-that management owes a
duty to the "corporation and its shareholders"-
masks the most fundamental issue: to what interest does the board
look in resolving conflicts between interests in the corporation that
may be characterized as "shareholder long term interests" or "cor-
porate entity interests" or "multi-constituency interests" on the
one hand, and interests that may be characterized as "shareholder
short term interests" or "current share value interests" on the
other?2
46
Chancellor Allen noted that the expression "corporation and its share-
holders" and related legal doctrine originated outside the takeover con-
text.247 In these more traditional contexts, it is unnecessary to sort out
the interests of shareholders, on the one hand, and noninvestors or the
"corporation" on the other because
the interests of the shareholders as a class are seen as congruent
with those of the corporation in the long run;... in managing the
business and affairs of the corporation, [the directors] may find it
prudent (and are authorized) to make decisions that are expected
to promote corporate (and shareholder) long run interests, even if
short run share value can be expected to be negatively affected, and
thus directors in pursuit of long run corporate (and shareholder)
value may be sensitive to the claims of other "corporate
constituencies." 248
Here Chancellor Allen does exactly what was done in the older charita-
ble contribution cases to which he makes reference; he reconciles the in-
terests of shareholders and other claimants on corporate activity by
reference to the vague and unknowable long run.
Although it is generally possible to hammer corporate and share-
holder interests into congruence in this fashion outside the takeover con-
text, Revlon makes it clear that inside the takeover setting, short-term
shareholder interests sometimes become paramount and take precedence
over all other interests. The question that occupies and puzzles Chancel-
lor Allen in TW Services-the question he poses and ponders but con-
cludes he need not answer-is whether a board can be thrust into a
245. See id.
246. Id. V 94334, at 92178 n.5.
247. See id. 94334, at 92178; supra notes 129-31, 180-81 and accompanying text.
248. TWServices, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94334, at 92178 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 2, 1989) (footnote omitted).
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Revlon mode against its wishes so that it must maximize short-term
shareholder wealth.249 Put another way, "when, if ever, will a board's
duty to 'the corporation and its shareholders' require it to abandon con-
cerns for 'long-term' values (and other constituencies) and enter a cur-
rent share value maximizing mode"? 250 Does it arise when eighty-eight
percent of the shareholders essentially have declared, by tendering their
stock, "that they do seek a current share value maximizing transaction
now?" 25
1
Chancellor Allen is troubled by the most fundamental questions of
all. Is the point of corporate endeavor always and solely to attain current
wealth for shareholders? If shareholder wealth maximization is not the
point at all times, can it be made so by a tenacious bidder? In spite of the
Interco and Pillsbury cases, which shortly preceded TW Services and
which he assiduously seeks to distinguish, Chancellor Allen does not be-
lieve that the answers to these foundational questions lie in an unthinking
reliance on the notion of shareholder primacy achieved through share-
holder choice. Initially, the Chancellor gets snagged on the unhelpful
concept of loyalty-thereby revealing the paucity of doctrinal concepts
that speak to the elemental issue of institutional meaning. He recognizes,
however, the need for "some model or another to define the details of the
relationship among directors, the corporation and its shareholders.
'25 2
The Chancellor also astutely sees that reference to a descriptively power-
ful theoretical model will not alone resolve the issue, which he rightly
perceives "inescapably to involve normative questions. ' 253 These norma-
tive questions are profoundly important for society at large; question that
today have fallen to the Delaware judiciary. Allen clearly appreciates
that the questions are to be answered in the language of, but not solely by
reference to, the twin strands of corporate doctrine. The judges must
draw on the deeper wellsprings of social norms.
25 4
Once that is apprehended, however, Revlon's emphasis on share-
holder wealth interests once a sale is inevitable and Interco's and Pills-
bury's trumpeting of shareholder autonomy both become only particular
normative preferences residing side by side with a legion of others. These
preferences, then, are subject to rejection in the service of more impor-
249. See id. 94334, at 92179-80.
250. Id. 94334, at 92180.
251. Id.
252. Id. 94334, at 92180 n.14. Here Chancellor Allen reintroduces the notion of the corpora-
tion, which he inexplicably dropped from his analysis in Interco. See supra note 215.
253. TWServices, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94334, at 92180 n.14 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
254. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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tant ends. Chancellor Allen faintly anticipates this extension of his own
thinking. He counters that because there is no long run for shareholders
once in the Revlon mode, it does not matter for them "that a buyer who
will pay more cash plans to subject the corporation to a risky level of
debt, or that a buyer who offers less cash will be a more generous em-
ployer for whom labor peace is more likely. ' 255 Although this conten-
tion is undoubtedly true, it merely expresses the conflict between
shareholder and other interests; it does not resolve it. Allen appreciates
that a normative preference quite properly has been made in derogating
shareholder desires for current wealth outside the Revlon mode. Yet he
fails to explain why normative choice is illicit once inside the Revlon
mode. Allen is patently inconsistent in suggesting either that there is no
room for choice or that shareholders, rather than judges, should decide
the question of corporate purpose in certain cases. What Allen should
say is that in one set of cases (Revlon, Interco, and Pillsbury), he prefers
the norm of shareholder primacy over competing norms like labor peace
and a debt-free entity, while in other cases he does not. Chancellor Allen
should also describe the even more elemental and authoritative norm
that enables him to differentiate those two instances. Surely conven-
tional corporate-law concepts are out of their depth in this realm of nor-
mative inquiry and are of no help. Above all, Allen should not pretend
that a choice has not been made or that another selection is not possible.
Notwithstanding this unsettling defect, the TW Services opinion
takes an important step toward recognizing that the norm of shareholder
primacy--only recently honored in Interco and Pillsbury-is but one
norm in a hierarchy of norms and is defeasible and subject to qualifica-
tion. Shareholder primacy had no sooner begun to flower than it began
to fade. Doubt had set in.
5. Retrenchment.-The second major case decided by Chancellor
Allen in 1989-In Re Time Inc. Shareholders Litigation (Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.) 256 -was perhaps the most visible
and highly charged of all recent takeover battles. Paramount strenuously
tests Chancellor Allen's dry-run thinking in TWServices, and the result
is a splendid example of how "in an opinion legal power is actually exer-
cised before our eyes."' 257 The relationship between the decisions in TW
255. TWServices, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94334, at 92179 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 2, 1989).
256. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd,
565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
257. J.B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM
(forthcoming 1990).
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Services and Paramount is instructive for what it teaches about the means
by which legal doctrine interacts with social norms. How social norms
are hauled up into legal doctrine and, in turn, how legal doctrine colors
social beliefs are valid and critical concerns about the common-law
method. At Justice Scalia's forceful urging, these concerns have even
broken into the constitutional arena.25 8
Professor Eisenberg has emphasized that the legal culture and its
practitioners are critical to the interchange between these two spheres.259
Occupants of the legal community serve as a kind of clerisy or interpre-
tive community,260 one function of which is to screen and translate
widely held social norms into legal doctrine.261 In the corporate-law
area, the New York City and Delaware corporate bars fulfil this role.262
Understandably, some might be highly skeptical about whether an elite
group of professionals occupying a tiny subculture on the eastern sea-
258. For example, in upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty for those as young as
16, Justice Scalia noted that only 15 states expressly prohibit executions for murders committed at
age 16, a fact that "does not establish the degree of national consensus this Court has previously
thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual." Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S.
Ct. 2969, 2975-76 (1989). Justice Scalia argued that if the Court did not look to the existence or
absence of a societal consensus as manifested in state legislation, the Justices would decide not as the
"judges of the law," but as "a committee of philosopher-kings." Id. at 2980. Responding in dissent,
Justice Brennan objected to Scalia's looking only to state legislation to fathom society's beliefs. He
argued that the opinions of respected organizations such as the American Bar Association and the
American Law Institute, each of which opposes execution of persons under age 18, are also impor-
tant barometers of social norms. See id. at 2984-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.6 commentary (1980); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF DEL-
EGATES 17 (1983). Brennan asserted that doing otherwise would serve to "return the task of defin-
ing the contours of Eighth Amendment protection to political majorities." Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at
2986-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
259. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 47, at 9-13, 96-99, 118-21, 154-61. By emphasizing a law-
yer's work with legal doctrine in a litigation forum, Eisenberg's portrayal may miss another way in
which lawyers influence behavior. Often a lawyer counselling a client outside the courtroom-
where, after all, most law work takes place--can influence behavior by direct reference to social
norms that have no tidy analogs in the realm of doctrine. Through the faculty of good judgment and
the power of discernment, a lawyer may stir a client to consider a whole host of factors-from cost
and public relations to considerations of decency and fair play-in deciding what course of action to
take. See Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 865-67 (1987). In short, lawyers
not only screen and translate for judges; they--one hopes-discuss how social norms should bear on
client behavior.
260. For a description of the notion of interpretive community found in the work of Professors
Stanley Fish and Owen Fiss as involving "a shared commitment to common understandings that
shape the members' interpretive activities," see Millon, supra note 133.
261. For example, Time attorney Robert Joffe, of Cravath, Swalne & Moore, argued to Chancel-
lor Allen that an incorrect ruling "would take corporate governance out of the hands of boards and
create a bias for the short term that would disrupt the economy." Sontag, The Heat was On-
Literally--in Delaware, Nat'l L.J., July 24, 1989, at 8, col. 3. Although advocates are prone to
hyperbole, it is still clear that Mr. Joffe sought to demonstrate a connection between a ruling on
corporate governance and wider social repercussions and to emphasize that Allen should be mindful
of that connection in arriving at his decision.
262. See Meyers, supra note 36, at 64, 65-67 (noting the influence of Wall Street lawyers and the
Delaware judiciary in formulating new theories of corporate law).
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board of the country are an accurate barometer of the beliefs of the popu-
lace at large. 263 The issue of where social norms originate, how and by
whom they are transmitted, and how they are deciphered is thus espe-
cially important to corporate law, particularly because lawyers on both
sides of takeover frays routinely speak the frail language of corporate law
as if they had no other choice. Because the dialectic is so problematic,
Chancellor Allen's extended rumination in TW Services was an open in-
vitation for the corporate bar to react, retool, and prepare to address
further that rather obvious tension between the direction in which In-
terco and Pillsbury were headed and Allen's palpable hesitation toward
that position. The lawyers participating in the Paramount case were thus
armed in advance with a full arsenal of readings on how existing legal
rules speak to basic takeover issues consonantly with widespread beliefs.
Their preparation made for a clear presentation to Allen in the Para-
mount case and allowed him to briskly sweep away much of the philo-
sophical detritus that had stalled him before.264 For a court that plays
such a prominent role in corporate jurisprudence and that explores un-
trodden paths so frequently, the value of such ongoing professional dis-
course cannot be overestimated.
The Paramount case did not involve a poison pill. Paramount
sought to enjoin Time from buying Warner stock at seventy dollars per
share pursuant to a cash tender offer. Long before Paramount appeared
on the scene, Time and Warner had agreed to a stock-for-stock merger of
263. See id. at 468 (raising the possibility that such a defect may affect the common-law method
generally); see also Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765, 770-72 (1982) (discuss-
ing the narrow political interests of the legal profession); Michelman, Bringing the Law to Life. A
Plea for Disenchantment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 256, 266 (1989) (asserting that the legal profession's
commitment is to craft rather than to public values).
264. I am not suggesting that lawyers seek explicitly to align their clients' interests with the
larger public good. But see supra note 261. Rather, as lawyers pursued their clients' narrow inter-
ests in TW Services and other pre-Paramount decisions, the outcome was not simply victory or
defeat for the particular parties, but also a shift (sometimes subtle, sometimes dramatic) in the previ-
ous legal and normative climate. Lawyers representing target companies suffered serious setbacks as
Interco and Pillsbury improved the atmosphere for (and thus implicitly condoned) takeovers. Con-
versely, target-company lawyers received new hope from Chancellor Allen's candid confessions of
doubt about the appropriate analysis of (and thus, implicitly, the value of) takeovers in TWServices,
especially since that opinion coincided with renewed concern about takeovers in the larger political
arena. See supra notes 10, 75, 125; supra notes 246-48 and accompany text.
The job of target-company lawyers in a case like Paramount is to adapt their arguments to the
doctrinal and social turbulence created by TW Services and larger cultural currents and to further
amplify the reasons why the concerns raised in the case are better accommodated by an emphasis on
managerial discretion than by an emphasis on shareholder primacy. The result of this exchange over
time is not simply the refinement of legal doctrine, but a significant contribution to the continual
construction of a different normative climate for takeovers. For a sociological perspective on the




the two companies. 265 Time selected Warner as a merger partner only
after the Time board of directors had carefully considered how such a
merger would affect the zealously guarded "Time culture." In Chancel-
lor Allen's words, "This culture appears in part to be pride in the history
of the firm-notably Time Magazine and its role in American life-and
in part a managerial philosophy and distinctive structure that is intended
to protect journalistic integrity from pressures from the business side of
the enterprise. '266 Allen noted that this consideration was significant be-
cause Time's directors did not see the "mission of the firm... as wholly
economic ' 267 and because they were distinctly concerned with Time's
"larger role ... in society. ' 268
Both companies had scheduled special shareholder meetings to vote
on the proposed merger transaction. Shortly before the Time meetings,
however, Paramount made an all-cash all-shares tender offer for Time's
stock at a price of 175 dollars a share.269 As a result of that offer, and
because the Time board feared that Time shareholders might reject the
proposed merger in light of Paramount's offer, Time and Warner scut-
tled the merger agreement and, instead, agreed that Time would make a
cash tender offer for Warner stock.270
The effect of Time's cash offer was two-fold. First, such an offer,
unlike a proposed merger, does not require shareholder approval. Thus,
Time shareholders were deprived of the opportunity to vote no on the
merger, a vote that essentially would be a yes vote on the Paramount
offer. Second, because Paramount later raised its offer to 200 dollars a
share, and because Time's board conceded that Time's stock would, after
the acquisition of Warner, trade below that price-probably in a range of
100 to 188 dollars-Time shareholders were deprived of a chance to
choose between 200 dollars now and a significantly lower value now with
the possibility of an even higher premium in later years.271
Both Time shareholders and Paramount sued to enjoin Time's cash
offer. Because the postacquisition share price of Time's stock was likely
to be below Paramount's 200-dollar cash offer, Chancellor Allen framed
the pivotal legal issue as whether shareholders or management should
have the right to choose between high current value and possibly higher
265. In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litig. (Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.), [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94514, at 93269 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 565
A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
266. Id. 94514, at 93267.
267. Id. 94514, at 93269.
268. Id.
269. Id. 1 94514, at 93271.
270. Id. 94514, at 93272.
271. See id. 94514, at 93280.
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future value.2 72 Holding that, under the circumstances before him, such
power rested with management,2 73 Allen had to corral and synthesize the
discordant principles that had developed in takeover doctrine over the
past few years.
He first summarily asserted that because target management pos-
sesses superior information about the company's present and future con-
dition, it has the power and qualifications to reject the public market's
current valuation of the company's future earnings (or cash flow)
stream.274 So much for the clairvoyance of the capital markets. Next,
Allen emphasized that although the Revlon posture could be entered in-
voluntarily, the Revlon threshold and its corresponding duty to maximize
current share value is crossed only when a corporate transaction repre--
sents a change in control.2 75 He concluded that the initial merger agree-
ment between Time and Warner did not result in a change in control
because even though sixty-two percent of Time's shares would be trans-
ferred to Warner shareholders, the stock would remain widely dispersed
among public shareholders in a "large, fluid, changeable and changing
market. '2 76 As he did in Interco, Chancellor Allen read Revlon's flash
point narrowly and continued to regard that decision as neither remarka-
ble nor inconsistent with earlier corporate law. Allen further asserted
that because the board of directors of a target company standing outside
the Revlon mode is under no obligation to maximize current share value,
but may instead operate the corporation for long-run profit maximiza-
tion, Time's board had no freestanding duty to conduct a Revlon sale.277
Thus, Allen respected the reasoning of Revlon but he steadfastly refused
to extend it.
Having steered clear of Revlon's auction mandate, Allen still faced
Interco and Pillsbury and their newly minted emphasis on shareholder
choice. He noted that in both Interco and Pillsbury there was no threat
to the "corporation," only a threat to shareholders. 278 The distinction
between the corporation and the shareholders that Allen had carefully
drawn and explored in TW Services thus served him well. Moreover,
Allen characterized the two alternative transactions in Interco and in
Pillsbury as "functionally equivalent" to one another. 279 In contrast, he
272. See id. 94514, at 93278.
273. Id. 94514, at 93279.
274. See id. 94514, at 93277.
275. See id. 1 94514 at 93279.
276. Id. 94514, at 93280.
277. See id. 1 94514, at 93280-81.
278. See id. 94514, at 93283; supra note 215.
279. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94514, at 93283 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
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emphasized that because Time's board had planned the merger well in
advance of Paramount's offer, there were reasons to believe the merger
would serve long-run profit-maximizing goals and that it was not primar-
ily motivated to affect or retain control of the corporation.280 In other
words, because Time's board could advance plausible, preexisting busi-
ness reasons for the Warner deal, they could preclude shareholders from
choosing the Paramount offer. In reaching this conclusion, Chancellor
Allen came close to begging the question he posed earlier: Why, notwith-
standing those business reasons, and in spite of his careful efforts to dis-
tinguish Interco and Pillsbury, should shareholders be prevented from
choosing (or requiring management to choose on their behalf) between
200 dollars now and 150 dollars now, a choice many, perhaps most,
shareholders would exercise in favor of Paramount's higher offer of an
immediate 200 dollars?
Having framed the identical root issue in TW Services, Chancellor
Allen faced it squarely in Paramount. He addressed it at two levels.
First, Allen concluded that shareholders themselves have no right to
make that choice. Under established principles of Delaware corporate
law, they simply have no voice on whether to pursue a merger with or a
cash acquisition of Warner.281 Allen merely pointed out the obvious:
shareholders are passive bystanders, not active participants, in corporate
activity. That tender offers take place on capital markets does not alter
that fact. Second, Allen concluded that the board itself is not obligated
to "follow the wishes of the majority of shares. '28 2 Thus, in carrying out
its charge to direct the affairs of the corporation, management is not obli-
gated to maximize short-term shareholder wealth. Although the well-
being of shareholders rests wholly in its hands, the board, in accordance
280. See id.
281. Although Chancellor Allen stressed that Time's proposed acquisition of Warner was "per-
fectly conventional" and distinguishable from a more overt control mechanism like a decision not to
redeem a poison pill, that distinction collapses when pressed. See id. 94514, at 93284 n.22. In
effect, he was trying to explain why shareholders in Interco and Pillsbury were accorded choice while
those in Paramount were not. Just as this Article challenges Allen's defense of Revlon's auction
mandate, see supra note 255 and accompanying text, the best response to Allen's attempt to distin-
guish Interco and Pillsbury is simply to ask why a target board, citing concern for the corporate
enterprise rather than immediate shareholder value, should not be permitted to refuse redemption of
a poison pill. The boards of Interco and Pillsbury made the strategic mistake of trying to fight the
fire of a hostile bid with the fire of a restructuring alternative and, in so doing, invoked the norm of
shareholder primacy. Thus, it was not a great surprise that the court applied that norm with consid-
erable zeal in assessing the boards' actions. These actions, however, are quite different from stead-
fastly refusing to redeem a pill or restructure because of enterprise or nonshareholder considerations.
In the next post-Paramount case raising this issue, Allen will have to revisit the logic of Interco and
Pillsbury. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 30.
282. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94514, at 93284 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), affrd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
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with Burkean representative democracy,283 is free to follow its own
lights. With directorial skill, judgment, and luck, shareholders will pros-
per. Without it, they will not.
Chancellor Allen plainly preferred the management-discretion
strand over the shareholder-primacy strand. He concluded that neither
the procedural attribute of shareholder voice nor the substantive attri-
bute of entitlement to short-term shareholder wealth maximization were
innate elements of the shareholding status. He reached this conclusion
not by vague allusions to nonshareholder interests, but by highlighting
the importance of the "Time culture"-the interests of the corporate en-
terprise and its established and evolving policy, matters larger than the
thin axis running between shareholders and managers. In this respect,
Allen's thinking was actually quite traditional. He emphasized, as
pretakeover corporate doctrine has for decades, that management is not
the agent or trustee or direct representative of shareholders, but is a fidu-
ciary of the larger enterprise.284 His conclusion, however, far from pre-
serving takeovers as a powerful antidote to the failings of the slack,
pretakeover governance regime, ironically delivered takeovers into the
hostile hands of the very legal doctrine that grew out of that regime.
How could this result occur if the chief promise of takeovers was to re-
trieve shareholder primacy from the flagrant and embarrassing draw-
backs of that system? 285
One way out, of course, was for Chancellor Allen to refer to the
unknowable long run. After citing the directors' concern for the "Time
culture" and its larger role in society, Allen was quick to add that "there
is insufficient basis to suppose at this juncture that such concerns have
caused the directors to sacrifice or ignore their duty to seek to maximize
in the long run financial returns to the corporation and its stockhold-
ers."' 286 Allen thus reassured us that he had not forgotten or abandoned
shareholders; he had only modulated their appetites and tempered their
options by reminding them that Delaware's legal doctrine allows direc-
tors to "follow a course designed to achieve long-term value even at the
cost of immediate value maximization. 28 7 To support this assertion, he
283. See F. DREYER, BURKE'S POLITIcs: A STUDY IN WHIG ORTHODOXY 40 (1979) (explain-
ing that according to Edmund Burke's theory of parliamentary representation, members of Parlia-
ment acting within the limits of their trust are not required to follow their constituents' wishes).
284. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) S 94514, at 93284 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
285. See supra notes 44, 152 and accompanying text.
286. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 94514, at 93269 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989) (emphasis added), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989).
287. Id. 94514, at 93277.
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summoned the charitable contribution cases.288 Of course, those cases
and the many other ways in which traditional corporate doctrine had
subordinated shareholder welfare to managerial discretion were what
first led so many to trumpet the virtues of hostile takeover bids with their
crisp alertness to the here and now. Such observers perceived the "long
run" as an artful dodge by which shareholder interests were given lip
service while in fact they were jettisoned. Now, it looks as though Allen
has made the same distressing move with takeovers themselves.
To respond to that critique, one must break out of the cramped bi-
lateral mode of corporate-law analysis. The stark fact is that, with little
ado, both Allen and the larger universe of legal doctrine have renounced
full-fledged shareholder primacy not to favor management discretion as
an end in itself, but because, on balance, management discretion has
served the material expectations of society at large, if not those of certain
shareholders and corporate scholars. Therefore,, it would not be a resto-
ration or a return home to uphold shareholder primacy, but an acute
departure from an institutional arrangement that, while flawed, basically
is accepted. Shareholders cannot "go home again." The old place is long
gone. Allen's opinion honored its memory by referring to the capacious
long run, but rejected its claim to primacy as clearly as if he had said:
The chief meaning of corporate endeavor is not to make sharehold-
ers wealthy. That may well happen, of course, if the enterprise-
consisting of the efforts of many people coordinated by manage-
ment-is a success. But it happens as a consequence of that suc-
cess. It is not the very point of the activity.
Allen did not come out and say as much because doing so would be a bit
too frank and even dysfunctional. 289 The myth of unfettered shareholder
primacy may be doddering, but it still counter-balances managerial dis-
cretion and has yet to be abandoned. Therefore, given that the nature of
the shareholder claim on modern corporate activity has yet to be refor-
mulated to give it full (but not excessive) recognition, Allen had no
choice but to revert to the vernacular of traditional corporate doctrine.
That doctrine, however, is reloaded, nicely packed to express widely held
norms that corporate endeavor is not just about making shareholders a
little richer a little faster.
In another respect, too, Allen paid tribute to social norms.
Although he was keenly aware that he had to decide who-as between
shareholders and managers-is to resolve key takeover questions, he may
288. See id. t 94514, at 93277 n.15.
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or may not have been entirely self-conscious that he had to decide who
decides. 290 One cannot help but wonder how Chancellor Allen felt when
the task of speaking authoritatively to the momentous question of who
decides corporate purpose fell to him. Considerable sensitivity to the
enormity of this role of social mediator is evident in the modesty of his
stated range of possible responses. In deciding who decides, Allen care-
fully affirmed that he is not one of the candidates; the roster of contes-
tants includes shareholders and managers, not judges. Allen showed his
confidence that while commercial practices are rapidly evolving, the de-
cision-making structure in which such changes occur still enjoys wide-
spread support. He thus refused to give "substance" to Unocal,291 and he
refused to interject himself into disputes beyond confirming the proper
structure of the decision-making apparatus. Chancellor Allen recognized
that, however murky the divide, in our society business still is man-
aged-or so we say it is-in the "private" sphere. Judges cannot take
control of enterprises and make them serve shareholders. To do so
would be to breach the deep-seated norm of private enterprise. In his
restraint, then, Allen preserved the vitality of the common-law method of
adjudication by again lauding social norms. He refused to make either
shareholders or judges masters of the corporation, because most of us-
judges too-would accept neither of those outcomes.
V. Concluding Thoughts
The prevailing description of what Delaware's judiciary is doing
with hostile takeovers takes for granted the boundedness of corporate life
and the dichotomy between management discretion and shareholder pri-
macy in corporate law. The judiciary is said to be painstakingly working
out the respective roles of shareholders and managers in responding to
takeover bids. The tools of analysis are the conventional twin strands of
corporate law, as modified in Unocal to better fit the peculiar dynamics
of takeover contests. This explanation is incomplete and misses a more
important subtext in these decisions. Unavoidably, the Delaware judici-
ary is also answering the question of corporate meaning, but it is treating
this leitmotif wholly within the stylized mode of traditional corporate-
law discourse. This observation is noteworthy not only because an ex-
tremely significant substantive issue is at stake but also because it reveals
the way in which judicial doctrine is, in corporate law as elsewhere, the
290. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
291. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 88, at 251 (noting that under Unocal, management




meeting place for competing notions of institutional meaning. In resolv-
ing the issue, Delaware's judges are challenged to address the same bed-
rock questions that all judges face: Why do they get to settle this matter,
and on what bases do they decide?
So far, deconstructionists have not unleashed the full force of their
devastating critique on corporate law.292 Yet corporate law's dual
strands, each capable of overpowering and nullifying the other, are an
inviting target for such an analysis. To save corporate law from that
critique, this Article argues that judges are not trapped in the fabricated
and indeterminate world of corporate law but eventually express, albeit
crudely, tentatively, and open-endedly, the sentiments of vast numbers of
citizens. On the takeover front, Delaware's judges are forging an an-
swer-at least they are rejecting one answer-to the question of institu-
tional meaning in a way that conforms to the sentiments of large groups
of people. The current outcome-and by no means is it over-is not
pleasing to many takeover proponents or corporate law scholars, and it
dishevels the closed world of corporate law and its chosen set of con-
cerns. Yet, to preserve trust in the corporate institution as well as to
sustain the legitimacy of their own adjudicating function in a democratic
society, these judges must ground their decisions on norms with approval
wider than the thin thread of shareholder primacy.
The actions of Delaware's judges on the takeover front reveal how
common-law doctrine ultimately must square with underlying social
norms. Their opinions chronicle a clumsy but fascinating doctrinal ex-
pression of ambivalent social expectations of corporate behavior. For
courts to embrace a radically proshareholder vision of corporate en-
deavor would be substantially out of line with prevailing social norms,
however soothing that outcome might be for corporate law's own peace
of mind. Serious judicial doubt as to whether society at large is prepared
to adopt a relentlessly proshareholder conception of corporate purpose
can. only lead to the conclusion that management discretion should not
be dislodged. However annoying management's smug defense of its au-
thority to consider noninvestor interests, and however intellectually at-
tractive and coherent a proshareholder vision might be, shareholder
primacy does not ring true; therefore, it must remain subdued.
In one sense, then, the rejection of total shareholder primacy is dis-
appointing because it leaves corporate law's longstanding and legitimate
struggle with accountability unresolved. In another sense, however, the
292. But see Frug, supra note 4, at 1373-77 (advocating a revision of market theory to confront
and transform the structure of large-scale bureaucratic organizations).
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rejection is reassuring, not simply because it reveals the admirable exper-
tise, care, and sensitivity Delaware's judges bring to their work, but also
because it provides insight into a problem that haunts legal theorists:
How can the common-law method, which is so central to our legal sys-
tem, respond to the strenuous challenge of critical legal studies (and legal
realism before it) without reverting to the unsatisfactory position of the
formalists? The task for believers in the common-law process is to steer
clear of both extremes. Nowhere is that task more evident than in corpo-
rate law, which unsuccessfully struggles to stand aloof from that larger
philosophic debate.
Corporate law possesses both the strengths and the weaknesses of
legal formalism. Its strength is its useful ability to compartmentalize the
social world, to block temporarily the full force of raw experience in an
effort to assimilate and register portions of that world in digestible form.
The corresponding weakness is corporate law's propensity to treat its
own analytical constructs as fetishes-to insist that its tools can quell the
unnerving tendency of commercial phenomena to squirt away like social
quicksilver-and hence its denial that its vision is partial, bound in time
and place, and somewhat disengaged from the very reality it aims to
explain.
Deconstruction suffers from the opposite problems. Its strength is
its incessant call to peel back the facade of certainty-to emerge from
snug cocoons of knowledge and to acknowledge and relentlessly reexam-
ine the constructedness of social and intellectual categories. Deconstruc-
tion's weakness is its profound misunderstanding of the human need for
limits, its failure to see that there is no "perfect freedom from inner con-
straint and from outer authority, '293 that inside total self-awareness
there is nothing to lean on and shove off from, and that culture itself "is a
compromise with life that makes human life possible. ' 294 The theoretical
challenge is to appreciate the strengths of each stance so that we can
appropriate for law what Phillip Rieff observed about character: "Char-
acter is the restrictive shaping of possibility. ' 295 To be realized, we must
at some point make infinite possibility finite, reduced, channelled, and
restricted-and give it expression in the form of doctrine.
At the doctrinal level, Delaware's judges are testing the strength of
the two strands of corporate law, sometimes favoring management dis-
cretion, other times emphasizing the importance of shareholder auton-
293. E. BECKER, supra note 46, at 266.
294. Id. at 265.
295. Rieff, The Impossible Culture: Oscar Wilde and the Charisma of the Artist, ENCOUNTER,
Sept. 1970, at 33, 40 (emphasis added).
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omy and well-being. At a deeper level, though, these doctrinal strains
mirror warring conceptions of corporate purpose. This fact should be
openly confessed. The world of legal doctrine is not a world unto itself,
hermetically sealed from the encroachment of other beliefs. Instead, it is
the place, as in an individual's soul, where those beliefs can meet, com-
pete, and be ordered, for a time. As the Delaware judiciary inches out-
ward on one or the other doctrinal branch, it does so only by inquiring
whether the heretofore operationally dominant strand-management dis-
cretion-is ripe to yield to the shareholder-primacy norm. Although
Revlon, Interco, and Pillsbury reflect substantial movement in that direc-
tion, TWServices and Paramount reveal a firm vestige of resistance. Un-
til a clearer, broader-based swell of support for shareholder primacy
appears, there will be no clean break away from management toward
shareholder centrality. Judges imaginatively express this social disso-
nance within the linguistic bounds of corporate-law doctrine, but their
opinions sound tinny because corporate law's limited reservoir of rules
was not designed for speaking to such a basic question.
The discipline of corporate law should acknowledge the richness
and complexity of commercial endeavor. It should not flee like a child to
the safety of anxiety-reducing formalism and the illusion of immutable,
"once and for all" meaning. Yet, efforts to trash corporate law as a
shameless show of personal or political force greatly underestimate judi-
cial responsiveness to social norms. System building and system de-
bunking are both enjoyable pastimes, and both methodologies share a
common trait: Each points to the same world of human action and pop-
ular belief. More disturbing than the repressed stance of formalism or
the boundless critique of deconstruction may be the shriveled social real-
ity to which they both refer. After all, while judges sensibly reject share-
holder primacy, they have only a lesser evil to which they can reluctantly
turn. If those two choices accurately reflect the full menu of expression
for our social norms on corporate meaning, it is not corporate managers
or judges we ought to be examining; it is ourselves.
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